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An assessment of the safety culture at an accredited four year collegiate aviation program 
was conducted. The Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Assessment Survey 
(CAPSCAS) was used. Participants were drawn from flight students and instructors in the 
program.  The survey captured the perceptions of participants on the status of the safety 
culture in the program. Generally the participants had a good perception of the safety 
culture in the program. There were significant variances in the perception of respondents 
on the safety culture by year groups and it was observed that respondents, who had spent 
more years in the program, had a better perception, on the safety culture. There were also 
significant differences in the perceptions of US resident students and international 
contract students, with the latter having a less favorable perception of the safety culture in 
the program. The results show that differences in national culture can have an effect on 
perceptions on safety culture. Risky personal attitudes of respondents that could 
influences safety behaviors were correlated with their perception on the safety culture and 




Modern aviation operations are growing ever more complex in times of increased 
demand for services with decreased resources (Wensveen, 2010). Organizational factors 
like safety culture and regulatory oversight play significant roles in the foundation of 
safety in high-risk systems (von Thaden, 2008). Several high profile accidents in the late 
twentieth century brought considerable attention to the role of organizational safety 
culture and regulatory oversight in accident causation  (von Thaden, 2006)  (Wiegmann, 
2004).  Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has established a 
comprehensive and integrated procedure to encompass a national standard of system 
safety, with the introduction of Safety Management System in aviation operations (FAA, 
2008).  
Safety Management Systems (SMS) is a top-down and businesslike approach to 
safety, that emphasize proactive and data driven management of safety, distinct from 
the traditional reactionary approach (FAA, 2008). SMS has become the next generation 
safety initiative and a new rule on SMS, as set forth in 14 CFR Part 121 operations, was 
supposed to come into effect on 04 September 2012 (FAA, 2010). The new rule would 
have made it mandatory for aviation service operators in the United States (US) to 
implement SMS in their operations. As at now the rule has since not come into effect.  
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 The responsibility for operational safety lies with the aviation organizations, but 
the FAA will ensure that the organizations comply with their safety responsibilities 
(FAA, 2008). A good indicator for organizational safety culture requires the 
identification, analysis, and prioritization of information to mitigate hazards and risks. 
SMS will provide an organized approach to safety procedures/processes and 
performance management (von Thaden, 2008). 
 As aviation organizations strive to maintain economic viability in a varied global 
environment they must continually modify their business processes and even their 
workforce to provide services in times of accelerated aviation activity paired with 
diminishing resources (Wensveen, 2010). While it may be strategically advantageous to 
reengineer business processes from time to time in order to remain f unctional, ongoing 
and updated safety efforts must not be overlooked (von Thaden, 2008).  As the 
aviation industry continues to evolve, safety efforts must also remain a business 
priority (FlightSafety Foundation, 2011). For example, high fuel costs can dramatically 
increased a collegiate flight program’s operational budget, which can negatively affect 
financial resources allocated for safety programs. 
 In order to control costs, many airlines have had to schedule fewer flights; as a 
result this has also sacrificed revenue (Trejos, 2012).  In fact, the ten largest airlines in 
the US posted a combined loss of $1.07 billion as at the first half of the 2012 fiscal year 
(June, 2012), due largely to high fuel prices (Zacks , 2012) .  While there are a number 
of economic concerns  that  may  influence  an  airline’s  prioritization  of  safety,  a  
difficult economic  situation  may  lead  an  airline  to  redirect  resources  away  from 
3 
functions  that  are essential to safe operations (Stolzer, 2011)  thus pushing the limits of 
the current state of safety. 
 Managing safety has become increasingly more important as aviation 
organizations diversify (Patankar, 2003). Thus aviation has adopted Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) to espouse a quality management approach to complex aviation safety and 
business relationships (FAA, 2008; ICAO, 2009).  SMS provides  an  organizational  
framework  to  effectively  manage  safety  and  serves  as  the  very structure that 
generates a positive safety culture (von Thaden , 2008).   SMS frameworks have shown 
effectiveness when not only adopted as part of a business, but when adopted as part of 
regulatory oversight operations (FAA, 2008).  
 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued AC 120-92A to introduce the 
concept of Safety Management System (SMS) to aviation service providers like collegiate 
aviation organization (Part 141) under FAA SMS Guidance; Order 8000.369 and Aviation 
Safety (AVS) Requirements Document; Order VS 8000.367. The Airline Safety and 
Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-216) directed the FAA to issue a 
final rule on SMS by July 30, 2012. The FAA is systematically working on establishing 
requirements for US aviation certificate holders to implement SMS.  
 The implementation of SMS and the sustenance of a positive safety culture in a 
collegiate aviation program can generate both economic and operational benefits. Moncton 
Flight College (MFC) in New Brunswick implemented SMS and realized a $25,000 
annual savings with a 22% reduction in insurance premiums along with a significant 
reduction in regulatory audit findings (Moncton Flight College, 2009). “SMS has been a 
critical factor in the success of MFC and had a significant influence on the number and 
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size of the training contracts signed” according to Michael Doiron, Principal and CEO of 
Moncton Flight College (Lu , 2011).  
 Continued research into proactive organizational safety culture provides a better 
understanding of organizational performance, accountabilities, policies and procedures 
surrounding safety (von Thaden, 2008).  The aim of this new oversight relationship 
between aviation organizations and regulatory authorities is to shift away from a 
prescriptive era to one of proactive and systematic business oriented safety management 
(Stolzer, 2011). The aviation organizations must consider the nature and amount 
of information required to allow the FAA minimal policing yet optimal influence over 
organizational safety. 
 Adding to the well-known collection of voluntary self-assessment tools 
advocated by the FAA as complementary to traditional regulatory requirements (e.g., 
Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP), Aviation Safety Analysis Programs (ASAP), 
Flight Operations Quality Assurance programs (FOQA), and Line Operations Safety 
Audit (LOSA) etc.), the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS)  has been 
developed by researchers at the University of Illinois Urbana –Champagne to serve as 
an aviation self-assessment instrument designed to aid operators in measuring 
indicators of their organization’s safety culture. The instrument targets areas that work 
particularly well and areas in need of improvement (von Thaden, 2008). 
The CASS has been validated and improved over many years (Gibbons, 2006; 
von Thaden, 2008). The CASS enables collection of data and analysis of safety culture 
information, which allows aviation organizations to evaluate and strategize about the 
findings which would help to implement best practices for operation, and ultimately 
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yield the highest probable safety outcome (von Thaden , 2008). The CASS has four 
major scales, namely formal safety (reporting systems, response/feedback and safety 
personnel), informal safety (accountability, pilot authority and professionalism), 
Operations interactions (working relationship between pilots and supervisors/middle 
management) and organizational commitment (safety values, safety fundamentals and 
going beyond compliance). 
Statement of the Problem 
 The successful implementation of an SMS initiative in a collegiate aviation 
program is strongly influenced by the safety culture status of  front- line personnel like 
CFI’s and flight students. The norms, perceptions, values and attitude toward safety of 
these groups of people will have an impact on the safety culture of the organization 
(Cooper, 2000). The problem that affects the continuous improvement of the SMS is how 
to assess the perception, attitude and behavior of students and flight instructors, in 
relation to safety after the implementation of a formal process of an SMS program , and 
to determine whether they have identified with objectives of the program.  
Purpose of the Study 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has identified a number of 
areas in which certain elements of aviation safety programs may be further supported and 
enhanced, through Safety Management Systems (ICAO, 2009). One important 
component for the successful implementation of an SMS program in any aviation 
organization is the positive status of the organizational safety culture.  The purpose of 
this study is to use the Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Survey (CAPSCUS), 
which is a modified form of the CASS, specifically for collegiate aviation program, to 
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assess the safety culture perception of commercial aviation students and certified flight 
instructors (CFI’s). The study would be done at an accredited four year Part 141 
collegiate aviation program in the North-Western part of the United States of America 
(USA).   
The CAPSCAS will provide a baseline measure of the collegiate program’s safety 
culture, thus obtaining a benchmark to judge critical movement and change in the 
aviation program’s safety culture. The study will also use a consistent framework to find 
the strength of relationship between perceived state of safety culture and safety behavior 
among the commercial aviation students and CFI’s.The study will also attempt to 
establish a safety culture assessment methodology, which could be replicated in other 
similar collegiate aviation programs for comparison of results and ultimately the 
continuous improvement of collegiate aviation safety.  
Research Questions 
1.  What are the differences in perception among respondents [commercial flight 
students and certified flight instructors (CFIs)] on the status of the safety culture at an 
accredited four year collegiate aviation program? 
2.  What are the differences between the perception of international contract 
students and indigenous US students on the status of the safety culture at an accredited 
four year collegiate aviation program? 
3.  What is relationship between the perception of respondents (flight students and 
certified flight instructors) regarding the informal safety and operation interaction at an 
accredited four year collegiate aviation program? 
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4.  What is the relationship between the perception of respondents (students and 
certified flight instructors) on the formal safety program and their safety behavior at an 
accredited four year collegiate aviation’s program? 
5.  What is the relationship between the perception of respondents (students and 
certified flight instructors) on organizational commitment to safety and perceived 
attitudes that affects safety behavior at an accredited four year collegiate aviation 
program? 
Literature Review 
Positive organizational safety culture creates empowerment which gives 
responsibility and authority to all and to provide a horizontal safety hierarchy so as to 
treat every input equal to others (Bos, 2007). Wood (2003) commented that the feeling of 
involvement would motivate users of the SMS to contribute insights to safety 
performance. Effective safety management in the twenty-first century involves paying 
attention to human factors (PerezGonzalez, 2009). System components have as much 
potential to cause, or save, dangerous system states as technical components (Yule, 
2008).  
Lu (2005) states that by paying attention to human factors, aviation organizations 
can identify and capture potential hazards before they manifest as accidents. One method 
of achieving this is by measuring the state of safety through so-called ‘leading’ indicators 
such as safety culture or safety climate (Yule, 2008). These are seen as distinct from 
‘lagging’ indicators of safety such as accidents as they offer insight into the state of 
safety without the need for retrospective analyses of negative safety outcomes (von 
Thaden , 2006). 
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Defining and Building up a Safety Culture 
There is no single, universally-accepted definition of safety culture (Piers, 2009). 
Several academic articles have proposed definitions of safety culture, and there is a lively 
debate in professional circles regarding the distinction between safety culture and safety 
climate (Patankar, 2003). The term safety culture gained its first official use in an initial 
report into the Chernobyl accident (IAEA, 1986). This report introduced the concept to 
explain the organizational errors and operator violations that laid the conditions for 
disaster. For the purposes of this study, safety culture will be defined as “The set of 
enduring values and attitudes regarding safety issues, shared by every member of every 
level of an organization” (Piers, 2009). Safety Culture also “refers to the personal 
dedication and accountability of individuals engaged in any activity that has a bearing on 
the safe provision” (FAA, 2008). Without a doubt, the core accomplishment of SMS is 
to create a positive safety culture to maintain and further improve the entire system’s 
safety (IATA, 2011).  
Summary of Safety Culture Studies in Commercial Aviation Operations 
 
Wiegmann (2004) reported that ‘few formally documented efforts have been 
made to assess safety culture within the aviation industry, with the notable exception of 
military aviation’’ Three studies reported a safety assessment using commercial aviation 
pilots. The Australian Transportation Safety Board (2004) and Evans (2007) reported on 
the development of a safety culture questionnaire, designed to gain insight into pilots’ 
perceptions of workplace safety (N= 1308). The questionnaire consisted of six safety 
factors, each with five items. These factors were based upon previous safety culture 
research and input from aviation safety experts. Data from half of the sample were used 
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in an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) that resulted in a three factor model of: 
management commitment and communication, safety training and equipment, and 
maintenance. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the remaining half of the sample 
showed the three factor model to be an adequate fit to the data. 
Finally, the responses from different types of pilots (regular public transport, 
charter, or aerial work such as emergency medical services or agriculture) were compared 
on each of the four identified safety culture factors. No significant differences between 
the groups were found. The Australian Transportation Safety Board (2004) concluded 
that this was due to a single professional safety climate for pilots as a group, regardless of 
the organization for whom they worked. 
Gibbons (2006) developed a questionnaire designed to assess safety culture within 
the context of airline flight operations. Gibbons’ survey consisted of 84 items, grouped 
into five themes. The survey was designed by examining the content of safety culture 
questionnaires that have been used in other High Risk Organizations (HRO). A total of 
503 responses were received from a single company. After discarding 29 items and using 
CFA, the analysis eventually resulted in a structure of four broad factors (organizational 
commitment, operations personnel, informal safety system, and formal safety system), 
with three sub factors in each.  
Block (2007) reanalyzed the responses obtained from the 281 pilots from the 
Patankar (2003) previous Study. The purpose was to examine whether the data supported 
what Block, described as the purpose-alignment-control (PAC) model. A pair of experts 
recoded the Patankar (2003) survey items in accordance with the PAC model. The 
proposed factors were tested using a structural equation modeling methodology. The 
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main drivers of safety outcomes were organizational affiliation (similar to ‘pride in 
company’ from Patankar, 2003) and proactive management (partially derived from the 
‘safety opinion’ factor from Patankar, 2003). Organizational affiliation was directly 
influenced by communication, and proactive management was influenced by training 
effectiveness and relational supervision. 
The research and studies have all been done in the airline and maintenance 
organization (Patankar, 2003) (von Thaden, 2008) environment as well as in the Air 
traffic Control organization (Gordon, 2004) (Piers, 2009),but not much has been done in 
assessing the safety culture in flight training organizations,especially among flight 
students and flight instructors. This study intends to build up on the strong foundations 
built by parallel studies in other aviation organizations ,to assess the safety culture among 
this particular subset of aviation operations.   
SMS and Safety Culture in Collegiate Aviation in the United States 
Even though presently SMS and safety culture assessment are not regulatory 
requirements in the United States for aviation training organizations like collegiate and 
university aviation programs (FAA, 2010), a number of SMS pilot programs are being 
run by some proactive university aviation departments due to the immense positive 
benefits that they stand to derive  (Ullrich, 2012). SMS and a positive safety culture 
would be advantageous to collegiate aviation because they perform standardized 
activities towards established goals (FAA , 2012). 
Collegiate aviation has areas of particular risk because students may have little or 
no prior experience, and because malfunctions and unusual situations have to be 
simulated in order to expose these students to the variety of elements, as part of their 
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routine flying activity (FAA , 2012). In other words, in flying training, pilots may 
perform maneuvers that should not be accomplished as part of normal flight with the 
added risk that this entails. Collegiate aviation has had its fair share of tragic accidents 
and incidents (Bird Strike Control, 2009).  
There is an imperative need for controlling risk through an assessment of the 
prevalent safety culture inherent in the program (Patankar, 2003). There is no type 
specific framework for the assessment of safety culture in collegiate aviation and some of 
the few studies done have used modified survey tools more suited for airlines and airports 
(Bjerke, 2011). The safety culture assessment will provide the needed data and feedback 
to make changes that will continuously improve safety and ensure an integrated system 
wide safety net for training organizations (Mc Cune, 2012). 
Management of Organizational Safety Culture in Aviation 
In 2010, the Office of the Auditor of the City and County of Denver, Colorado 
conducted an audit on safety culture across different working units under the Department 
of Aviation ( Audit Services Division, City and County of Denver, 2010). The itemized 
audit was based on SMS criterions and had revealed that safety culture is a positive 
element at Denver International Airport (DIA). DIA is responsible for the design of 
safety policy, implementation of safety training, job hazard analysis and creation of 
airport safety committee to identify, analyze and mitigate potential hazards (Audit 
Services Division, City and County of Denver, 2010). 
The audit at DIA made recommendations for changes, such as ascertaining 
management commitment, improving employee collaboration, elevating the recognition 
of safety programs, building a no-fault near-miss reporting system, and identifying a 
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better way to collect and disseminate safety information (Audit Services Division City 
and County of Denver, 2010). A key indicator of management’s commitment to safety is 
the adequacy of resources, including financial support and empowerment from the top 
management (Simon, 2009). A bottom-up support and participation from operational level 
personnel is equally critical (Schiff, 2006).  
A ‘visible’ safety program helps to set the stage for improved employee 
attitude (Transport Canada, 2008).  Periodic safety related training and inspections by top 
management help to convince employees that the program is not merely administrative 
program of the month, but is an item of real concern (IATA , 2011). The employee gets 
involved. Once that occurs, employees participate, supervisors usually take the initiative, 
and the program evolves into an active force in the organization (Patankar, 2003). At this 
stage, employees subconsciously develop the habit of planning ahead and examining the 
safety, production, quality, and cost aspects of the task before them (Roughton, 2002). 
Although the physical safe-guarding of the workplace is a real factor in safety, the mental 
attitude of the employee is the ultimate key to avoiding incidents (Roughton, 2002). 
Establishing a management structure, assigning responsibility and accountability, 
and allocating appropriate resources must be consistent with the organization’s stated 
safety objectives (FAA ,  2010) . Discussing safety must begin with the analysis and 
understanding of an existing culture (Gibbons, 2006). Safety is the status of a hazard-free 
condition (ICAO, 2009). Culture is a behavioral norm consisting of beliefs, attitudes, and 
common values of an organization (Cooper, 2000; Lu , 2005) and Figure 1 shows 
the three part model. The culture in an organization normally embraces the structures, 





Figure 1.The Three Part Model of Safety Culture (Cooper, 2000)  
 
Component of a Positive Safety Culture 
A positive safety culture is the engine that drives the organization towards the 
goal of maximum attainable operational safety regardless of any formats of resistances, 
obstacles and pressures (ICAO, 2009). A positive safety culture promotes mutual respect 
among the employees and managers of the organization (Simon, 2009). A positive 
safety culture ensures that operational hazards and errors are anticipated (Stolzer, 2011). 
There are five components of a positive safety culture, namely informed, reporting, just 
cultures, learning and flexible cultures as outlined in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Safety Culture Components  ( FAA) 
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Informed Culture 
In an organization with an informed culture, administration, management, 
and front-line employees are aware of the current status of operation (ICAO, 
2009). An informed culture is a known process in which people are familiar with 
the elements of a company setting such as plans, policies, procedures, guidelines, 
programs, personnel, possible hazards, and, of course, safety expectations 
(Roughton, 2002). This informed culture also recursively measures the 
performance of the safety practice (Reason, 1997; Reason, 2003). 
Reporting Culture 
A positive safety culture of an organization is also a reporting culture that 
can only be achieved by creating an atmosphere of trust in which people are 
willing to divulge their errors as well as near misses (Simon, 2009). Utilizing the 
analogy of an iceberg, it has been determined that top management is aware of 
only about 4% of the significant safety problems, with line managers aware of 
only 9% and supervisors aware of about 74% (ICAO, 2006; Gordon, 2004). 
Thus, identifying untold safety deficiencies is essential to having an accurate 
view of the safety system of an organization (Gardiner, 2000).  
It is by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information about past 
events and close calls, can the organization locate where boundaries between safe 
and unsafe acts originate (Reason, 2003; L u ,  2 0 0 7 ) . In a reporting culture, 
management needs to implement protection for employees (Flightsafety 
Foundation, 2005). The process of data collection and analysis, feedback, 
appreciation, and ease of making a valid report are critical (Reason, 1997; Reason, 
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2003; Wood, 2003; Dekker, 2007). The drawback in a reporting culture is that 
sometimes, personnel turn in overly aggressive reports associated with adverse 
conditions, and these reports are not given adequate attention and response by 
management (IATA , 2011).  
Just Culture 
A culture is just, when there is a clear difference between unintentional 
and intentional acts (Flightsafety Foundation, 2005). Procedural non-compliance 
warrants a punishment approach (Frankel, 2006), while procedural unintentional 
errors require a non-punitive resolution (Dekker, 2007). The positive recognition 
in addition to punitive measures should be clearly established to facilitate the 
growth of a reporting culture and a firm belief of fairness (IATA, 2011).  
Creating a trustworthy and just environment will promote safety performance and 
efficacy and should be one of the organization’s goals and objectives (Lu,  
2006;  Reason, 1997; Reason  , 2003; Dekker, 2007).  
Even with a just culture, there are many barriers to overcome before a 
reporting culture can be fully shaped (Flightsafety Foundation, 2005).  The first 
barrier is the natural attitude of ridicule (Dekker, 2007).  The second barrier is 
the suspicion that the report may go on record and act as a form of potential 
backlash (Flightsafety Foundation, 2005).  The third is skepticism of the data 
application (Galloti, 2006). If one makes an observation on a weakness, people 
want to know that management will respond to the submission (Ullrich, 2012). 
The fourth barrier is resignation, which is a feeling of lack of empowerment or 
16 
contribution (Dekker, 2007). With this in mind, effective feedback loop and 
process integrity must be in place (Stolzer, 2011). 
Learning Culture 
A culture is a learning (adaptive) culture when both reactive and proactive 
measures are used to guide continuous education and wide-reaching system 
improvements rather than mere local fixes (ICAO, 2009). A learning culture is 
ineffective without reporting, informed, and just cultures so as to acquire current data 
and monitor past trends that may recur (Stolzer, 2008).  A learning culture is always aware 
of the potential risks and is aware of the past risks associated with any given procedure 
(Reason, 1997). 
Flexible Culture 
A Flexible culture means an organization has the capacity to reconfigure itself to 
continue running safely, even in times of stress or high tempo operations (United States 
Airforce, 2004). A flexible sometimes requires changes in an organizational 
transformation of a company’s beliefs (Wald, 2010;IATA , 2011). It involves the 
changing of values and norms among employees in order to improve productivity (Simon, 
2009).  A safety policy should first be adopted to provide a fundamental guideline and 
blueprint that will be embraced within an organization (Walton, 1985;Manuele, 2001).  
A safety policy further defines the organization’s commitment to safety and overall 
safety vision (ICAO, 2006; FAA, 2010).   
ICAO further requires the identification of an accountable executive from the 
top executives (an identifiable person having the responsibility for the effective and 
efficient performance of the organization) (Transport Canada, 2005).  This person has 
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the authority to assign resources to fulfill the obligations of the Safety Management 
System with resources for this SMS leadership position (ICAO, 2009). Implementing a 
culture change is introspective, so imposing a cultural change in an organization may 
meet with substantial resistance (In Wells, 2003).  
Management Commitment  
It is also essential to commit resources for the long term and to clearly identify a 
phased implementation approach of a positive safety culture (Ullrich, 2012).  Using 
existing forms, structures, manpower and active roles from the bottom-up within the 
organization could ease some of the resistance (Bos, 2007; Lu,  2008 ; Wood, 2003).  
Meanwhile, management must continue showing strong support for SMS which 
reinforces safety behaviors to be fully embraced as a norm (Piers, 2009).  Due to 
Hawthorne Effect (Landsberger, 1958) there could be temporarily increased safety 
awareness and safety climate simply because the employees are aware of the ongoing 
supervisor’s involvement (Lu, 2008).  
von Thaden (2008) stated that culture cannot be created overnight; thus changing 
the mindset and behavioral norm would take some time and needs continuous 
communication between management personnel and employees. Hudson ( 2001) also 
believed that what the eyes and ears observe, the mind and heart will gradually follow to 
get the momentum developed to initiate the cultural change. 
Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) 
Researchers at The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) 
developed a measure associated with safety culture in high reliability organizations 
(Gibbons, 2006). Since 2000 the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) has been 
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distributed globally in the aviation industry to large and small airlines and repair 
stations alike (von Thaden , 2006). The instrument has been refined to a four-factor 
model reflecting Organizational Commitment, Formal Safety programs, Operations 
Interactions, and Informal Safety programs (Figure 3)  (Weigmann, 2004; Gibbons, von 
Thaden & Wiegmann, 2006; von Thaden, Gibbons & Li, 2007, von Thaden, 2008). The 
CASS identifies the respondents’ perception of the current state, as well as the strengths 
and weaknesses, of the safety culture in an organization.  
Dimensions of Safety Culture Model of CASS 
There are some dimensions which define the indicators of a safety culture in any 
aviation organization and they are scaled in the four factor model of safety culture (von 
Thaden, 2008).These indicator scales are organizational commitment (OC), Operation 
interaction (OI), Formal safety indicators (FS) and Informal safety indicators (IS). The 
four scales are correlated with Safety Behavior (SB) which includes the perception of 
the organization’s risk (OR) and individual personal risk (PR) (von Thaden , 2008). 
Organizational Commitment (OC)  
Organizational commitment is reflected in three major areas: Safety Values 
(SV) the attitudes and values regarding safety expressed, in words and actions, by 
leadership; Safety Fundamentals (SF) the compliance with regulated aspects of 
safety such as training requirements, manuals, etc.; and Going Beyond 
Compliance (GBC) wherein priority is given to safety in the allocation of 
company resources (e.g., equipment, personnel time) even though they are not 
required by regulations. 
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Operations Interactions (OI) 
Operations Interaction is reflected in the working relationships between pilots and 
middle management, supervisors, and other distributed operations personnel (e.g. chief 
pilots, instructors/trainers, ground personnel, maintenance, dispatch, etc.)  It takes into 
account involvement in and concern for safety on their part. This entails the priority 
given to safety by operations personnel and their regard for the actual risks and issues 
associated with flying the line. 
Formal Safety (FS) 
Formal safety indicators are reflected in three areas: Reporting System (RS) 
which refers to the accessibility, familiarity, and actual use of the aviation operator’s 
formal safety reporting program; Response and Feedback (RF) which entails the 
timeliness and appropriateness of management responses to reported  safety  information  
and  dissemination  of  safety  information  to  employees;  and  Safety Personnel (SP) the 
perceived effectiveness of and respect for persons in formal safety roles (e.g., Flight 
Safety Officer, Director of Safety). 
Informal Safety (IS) 
 
Informal safety indicators are reflected in Accountability (ACC) the consistency 
and appropriateness with which individuals are held accountable for unsafe behavior; 
Authority (AU) which entails employee involvement and empowerment in safety 
decision making and Professionalism (PRO) reflected in areas such as peer culture for 
safety, pilot professionalism.   
Safety Behavior (SB) has subscales of personal risk (PR) and organizational risk 
(OR) and shows the perceived personal risk of personnel and the overall organizational 
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risk and how they are interrelated. The perceptions of personnel on their risky attitudes 
and at risk attitudes of others in the organization can have an effect on the safety behavior 
in the organization (Cooper, 2000).  A graphical representation of the CASS is showing 








This chapter discusses the study population, sample, and design in detail. The 
Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Survey (CAPSCUS) was developed by 
adapting the CASS and modifying it to specifically assess the safety culture in the flight 
operations of an accredited collegiate aviation program (Creswell, 2009). A screen shot 
of the survey is attached as Appendix A. The adaptation and modification was done 
with permission (von Thaden, 2012;Creswell, 2009).  
Validity 
A factor analysis in the form of Principal Component Analysis ( PCA) was 
conducted on the modified questionnaires in the survey to check the content validity. 
Content validity assesses the degree to which individual items represent the construct 
being measured (Field, 2009). PCA is normally used to develop questionnaires and is 
concerned with only establishing which linear components exist within the data,and how 
a particular variable might contribute to that component (Tabachnick, 2007). 
Reliability 
Relaibility check for all scales were run using the Cronbach alpha coefficient. 
This is a common measure of reliability of scales and is based on the correlation between 
items that can be found on a scale and the length of the scale ( Field,2009). The value of 
alpha can range from zero to one,but standards regarding it’s size depends on a factor. 
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Table 1.  Scales Inventory for the CAPSCUS as Modified From the CASS. 
Population 
The CAPSCUS was used to survey the perceptions of collegiate flight students 
and certified flight instructors of the safety culture at an accredited CFR Part 141 
flight training and four year degree awarding collegiate aviation department of a 
university in the North Western region of the United States of America (N= 945). The 
anonymous voluntary survey was delivered online in the English language. Participants 
were assured of the confidentiality of their responses (Appendix B). The population 
for the study included all four (4) year groups of commercial aviation students, 
international contract flight students and certified flight instructors at the university.  
CAPSCUS Major factor Scales                                                Sub-factor Scales 
 
Formal Safety Program                                                              Reporting System 
                                                                                                   Response and feedback 
                                                                                                   Safety Personnel 
 
Informal Safety Program                                                           Accountability 
                                                                                                   Pilot Authority 
                                                                                                   Professionalism 
 
Operations Interaction                                                             Supervisor of    
                                                                                                 Flight/Lead Flight /Chief               
                                                                                                 Flight Instructor 
                                                                                                 Dispatch/Ground and  
                                                                                                 Ramp Personnel  
   
Organizational Commitment                                                   Safety Values 
                                                                                                 Safety Fundamentals 
                                                                                                 Going Beyond    
                                                                                                 Compliance  
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The researcher sent a cover email invitation letter to all the participants’ 
mailboxes with the internet web link of the survey. The participants had access to the 
site and web link through a user name and password. Once securely logged in, 
participants responded to items in the survey instrument using a five (5) point Lickert 
scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neither disagree nor agree, agree, strongly agree) and 
a non-applicable option (Creswell, 2009). There was also an allotted space for 
respondents to include any additional comments. The data were collected and stored on 
a secure server of the University. 
Sample 
Sample participants were drawn from commercial aviation students, international 
contract flight students and certified flight instructors (CFIs) who are engaged in flight 
training at the aviation department. Air Traffic Control (ATC) students, Aviation 
Management students, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) students and Graduate students 
at the aviation department were excluded from the study because the focus was on flight 
personnel (Pilots).This was done to avoid any confounds (Creswell, 2009). 
Study Design 
Sample participants were recruited in several ways. First, an e-mail (Appendix 
C) was sent to a mailing list of all commercial aviation students in the aviation 
department through the assistance and permission of the chair and the various aviation 
students’ association leadership. An online advertisement was placed on the aviation 
department and students’ association website. Paper flyers were placed on notice boards 
in the Aviation Department on campus and the airport. The researcher sought permission 
from faculty to personally conduct class by class awareness drive for the survey.  
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Students Participation 
The assistance of the various aviation student associations was requested to 
publicize, the survey at meetings and through their website. This personal outreach was 
to further provide guidelines to any problem that will be encountered in trying to access 
the website and links. It also afforded the researcher an opportunity to clarify any issue 
on the survey.  All the methods included a description of the study and the Internet 
hyperlink. 
On line Survey Tool 
The survey was administered through an online survey tool called Qualtrics®. 
The survey was administered online to allow for simplicity of delivery and anonymity 
for the participants. In addition, this online method of delivery allowed participants to 
complete the survey at their own leisure. Once the participant loaded the survey, the first 
page included a description of the research and instructions on how to complete the 
survey. 
Response Period 
The survey was available from any computer with internet and link to the 
aviation department’s secure website. The survey allowed participants to have plenty of 
opportunity to provide more information if they wished to do so and some open ended 
questions were asked to specifically explore the nature of these activities. There were 
thirty questions broken into the following sections: Formal safety, Informal safety, 
Operational interactions, Organizational commitment, Safety behavior and lastly 
demographics. 
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The survey was active from the winter operational period of early February till 
the first week of March. After the response period was over, the submitted responses 
were downloaded from the secure site for analysis. Some of the submitted responses 
from the survey were excluded, from the total responses during analysis by the SPSS ® 
software due to missing data. These comprised of the responses from participants, who 
failed to answer any question beyond the consent page or did not answer any of the 
survey questions for that section.  
Methods and Data Collection 
The aim of this study was to use both quantitative and qualitative data of the 
perception of flight students and flight instructors to assess the safety culture in a 
collegiate aviation program. These are the questions that the data and analysis will seek 
to answer: 
1.  What are the differences in perception among commercial flight students and certified 
flight instructors (CFIs) on the status of the safety culture at an accredited four year 
collegiate aviation program? 
2.  What are the differences between the perception of international contract students and 
indigenous US students on the status of the safety culture at an accredited four year 
collegiate aviation program? 
3.  What is relationship between the perception of respondents (flight students and 
certified flight instructors) regarding the informal safety and operation interaction at an 
accredited four year collegiate aviation program? 
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4.  What is the relationship between the perception of respondents (students and certified 
flight instructors) on the formal safety program and their safety behavior at an accredited 
four year collegiate aviation’s program? 
5.  What is the relationship between the perception of respondents (students and certified 
flight instructors) on organizational commitment to safety and perceived attitudes that 
affects safety behavior at an accredited four year collegiate aviation program? 
Participant’s responses were received via the online survey tool and saved when 
the participants completed the survey. When the survey collection period ended, the 
responses were exported into Statistics Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) ® and 
securely given to the researcher for analysis. 
Protection of Human Subjects 
Participants volunteered their time and responses for this survey on their own 
free will and there was no form of coercion.  Every effort was made to protect 
participants from harm.  The survey received approval from the Institutional Review 
Board of the University of North Dakota.  All subjects were informed that participation 
was voluntary and that they need only answer the questions they felt comfortable 
answering.  Any response received in the essay format questions that could identify any 
specific person was de-identified by the researcher. The online survey tool collected no 
data that could link any specific survey to a participant. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Data Analysis 
Quantitative data was imported into the SPSS ® software and analyzed. All the 
additional comments and responses were coded manually by the researcher for themes 
and analyzed using SPSS. Significant values were set at the 0.05 alpha levels (2-
tailed).The survey was tested for content validity and reliability of scale. The major 
scales of the CAPSCUS were Formal Safety Program, Informal Safety Program, 
Operations Interactions and Organizational Commitment. There was also an aspect of 
Safety Behavior and responses were then correlated with components of the major 
scales. 
Content Validity 
A Principal Component Analysis ( PCA)  was conducted on the 61 items with 
orthogonal rotation  ( varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin ( KMO) measure verified the 
sampling adequacy for the analysis,  KMO = .84 and all KMO values for individual 
items was > .85,which is well above the acceptable limit of  .5  (Field, 2009). Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity χ²(1891) = 6304,p<.001,indicating that correlation between items were 
sufficiently large for PCA.  Thirteen components were extracted and had Eigen values 




 All the four major scales of the CAPSCUS (Formal Safety, Informal Safety, 
Operations Interaction and Organizational Commitment) showed high reliabilities. Test 
reliability refers to the consistency or reliability of a questionnaire items (Stevens, 2002).  
A reliable scale is one that will yield the same score for two different individuals with 
the same true level of the trait or attitude being measured, or for one individual tested 
twice (assuming that no changes have occurred between tests) ( Cronbach,1951;Cortina, 
1993) . Within a scale, items that assess the same underlying dimension are related or 
correlated with one another (Fields, 2009; Creswell, 2009). The values for reliability are 
outlined in Table 2 and show the Cronbach’s alpha values for all major scales.  
Table 2.  Cronbach’s  alpha for CAPSCUS. 
Major Scale                          Number of Items in scale (N)                      Cronbach’s α 
Formal Safety Program                     15                                                                     .90 
Informal Safety Program                   14                                                                     .85 
Operations Interaction                       19                                                                      .87 
Organizational Commitment             14                                                                     .86 
Total  for CAPSCUS                        62                                                                     .96 
 
Demographic Information 
 At the end of the response period, (N= 234) responses were obtained from the 
survey and comprised of fully (N= 142) completed responses representing 61% return 
rate. About 51.7% of the respondents provided comments in the text boxes provided for 
extra comments. There were some missing data in the responses and could not be used 
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for analysis due to the fact that the respondents decided not to answer those questions. 
The SPSS software was used to sort out the data with missing components and it was 
reported in the analysis. The breakdowns of the various responses are outlined under the 
major scales. 
Years in Flight Program 
 34% of respondents identified themselves as freshmen, 5% were sophomore, 
juniors were 17%, seniors were 22% and CFI/others were 21%. This number represents 
respondents who answered the demographic question about their status in terms of years 
spent in the flight program as students and CFI at the university. Those respondents 
who did not answer this question were removed by the SPSS® program. The total is 
found in Table 3 and figure 4. 
Table 3.  Category of Respondents 
Category                                        Number (N)                                 Percentage (%) 
Freshmen                                             46                                                     34 
Sophomore                                           7                                                        5 
Junior                                                   23                                                     17 
Senior                                                  30                                                      22  
CFI/Others                                          28                                                       21   





Figure 4.  Category of respondent (years spent in the flight program). 
 
Gender 
 The total respondents to this question was (n= 134) and it was predominantly 
males.93% reported males with 7% female, showing an under representation. Table 3 
shows the responses. 
Table 4.Gender Distribution of Respondents. 
 
Gender                                                      Number                                         Percentage 
Male                                                             125                                                     93  
Female                                                            9                                                        7 




Figure 5. Gender of Respondents 
 
International Contract Students 
 The respondents were asked about their status as either resident US students or 
International contract students in the university’s flight program. This was to find out 
how many international contract students responded to the survey. The flight program at 
the university has a number of international contract students from predominantly Asia 
and the Middle East, whose national culture and perception about the safety culture of the 
flight program of the university may not be the same as resident US students. One of the 
aims of the study was to find out if there was any difference in the perception on the 
status of the safety culture of the flight program by the two groups. Table 5 gives an 
overview of respondents. 
Table 5. International Students Status.  
 
International student Status               Number (n)                                    Percentage (%) 
Yes                                                           39                                                         29   
No                                                            95                                                          71  
Total                                                        134                                                        100 
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Figure 6. International Student Status. 
 
Age Group 
 Respondents were asked to give their age range. 12% reported that they were 
below 20 years,79% between 20-30 years,4% were 31-40 year group,1% was 41-50 year 
group,4% was 51-60 year group and 1% reported over 60 years. The year group summary 
is given below in table 6 and figure 8. It shows that the group with the greatest number 
was the 20-30 year group, which is normal, since the sample consisted mostly of flight 
students.  
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Table 6. Age Group of Respondents. 
Age Group                                             Number (N)                              Percentage (%) 
Below 20                                                    16                                              12 
20-30                                                          106                                            79 
31-40                                                            6                                                4 
41-50                                                            1                                                1 
51-60                                                            4                                                3 
60+                                                               1                                                1 
Total                                                          134                                            100 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the graphical summary of the age distribution of respondents. 
 
Figure 7. Age Distribution. 
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Airman Certificates and Ratings of Respondents 
 Respondents were asked to provide the highest airman certification (FAA) and 
ratings acquired. 13% were student pilots, 39% private, 5% commercial–single engine, 
15% commercial-multiengine, 3% CFI, 11% CFII, 6% MEI, 7%ATP, 5% mixed 
certificates. Most of the mixed certificates were those who chose to include their 
commercial and air transport pilot certificates to their flight instructor certificates. Table 
7, highlights the certificates and ratings. 
Table 7. Airman Certifications and Ratings. 
 
Airman Certificates/Ratings                     Number (N)                           Percentage (%) 
 
Student                                                               18                                            13 
Private                                                                52                                            39           
Commercial Single-Engine                                 7                                              5   
Commercial Multi-Engine                                 20                                            15 
CFI                                                                      4                                               3 
CFI (Instrument)                                                15                                            11 
Multi-Engine Instructor (MEI)                            8                                               6  
Air Transport Pilot (ATP)                                    3                                               7 
Others/Mixed Certificate                                      7                                                5 




Figure 8. Airman Certification and Ratings . 
 
Safety Reporting 
 Respondents were asked whether they have ever reported any safety problems or 
occurrence in the flight program at the university. This was to get an idea of how their 
perceptions correlated with their safety reporting behavior. 38% of the respondents said 
Yes and 62% replied No. The summary of the responses are outlined in the table 8 and 
figure 9. 
Table 8. Reporting of Safety Problems . 
 
Reporting Safety Problems              Number (N)                                   Percentage (%) 
Yes                                                           50                                                   38 
No                                                            83                                                   62  





Figure 9. Reporting of Safety Problems. 
 
Summary of the Survey Results 
 A Five (5) point Likert Scale gave respondents, the choice to select their response 
as either strongly disagree,disagree,neither agree/disagree,agree,strongly agree and non-
applicable/no response. Values (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) were assigned to responses in that order. 
The value (0) was assigned to non-response and (6) assigned to non-applicable. The scale 
mid-point was neither agree/disagree (3) and negatively worded items were reverse coded 
using SPSS, to obtain a standardized and comparable reading for the data. The scale 
reflected, that higher measurement values, represented higher quality of safety culture. 
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Formal Safety Scale Indicator 
 Out of the total responses submitted (N= 234) at the end of the survey period, 
(N=71) responses were excluded, by the SPSS program, because either there was no 
response or the non-applicable option was selected by respondents for that section. The 
usable responses were (N= 163). The mean (M= 3.65), and Standard Deviation (SD = 
0.53) perception of respondent on the Formal Safety program of the university was above 
the neutral point value of 3 (Neither agree nor disagree) on the 5 point Likert scale. This 
shows that on the average respondents had a good perception of the program as reflected 
on the indicator scale. The sub scales for Formal Safety were Reporting Systems, 
Response and Feedback and Safety Personnel. 
Reporting Systems 
 The Reporting system sub scale (N= 123) had five items. The highest mean (M= 
4.16, SD = 0.97) perception was for the question ‘The safety reporting system of the 
university is convenient and easy to use’. A simple bar graph and box plot was used to 
for analysis of the result. Box plots are able to visually show different types of 
populations, without any assumptions about the statistical distribution (Field, 2009).  
The spacing between the different parts of the box helps to indicate variance and skew 
and to identify outliers.   
 The box itself contains the middle 50% of the data.  The upper edge (hinge) of 
the box indicates the 75th percentile of the data set, and the lower hinge of the box 
indicates the 25th percentile.  The line in the box indicates the median value of the data.  
If the median line within the box is not equidistant from the hinges, then the data is 
skewed.  The ends of the vertical lines or "whiskers" indicate the minimum and 
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maximum data values, unless outliers are present in which case the whiskers extend to a 
maximum of 1.5 times the inter-quartile range.  The points outside the ends of the 
whiskers are outliers or suspected outliers. 
 
Figure 10. Histogram showing responses for ‘Safety system is convenient to use’. 
 
 
Figure 11 . Box plot of responses for ‘safety reporting system is convenient to use’. 
 
 The figure shows that almost 75 % of respondents had a highly favorable 
perception about the convenience and ease of use of the university safety reporting 
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system that was above the mean perception (4.16). The lowest mean perception for 
responses to a question in this sub-scale was (M= 3.14, SD= 1.83) ‘Pilots do not bother 
reporting near misses or close calls, since this event does not cause real damage’. Note 
this mean perception is still above the neutral point of the scale. 
 








 The box plot shows a negatively skewed distribution with more than 50 % of the 
respondents having an unfavorable perception that ‘pilots do not bother reporting near 
misses or close calls, since these events don’t cause any real damage’. 
Response and Feedback 
 The subscale (N= 123) had five items and the response for ‘My university keeps 
confidential data base of responses and feedback’ had the highest favorable mean 
perception rating of (M= 4.02, SD = 1.20).Figures 14 and 15 show the responses to the 
subscale. 
 




Figure 15. Box Plot of Responses to ‘My University keeps confidential database ’. 
 
 For this subscale, the least favorable mean perception was on the response for 
‘My University only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routine ones’. 
The mean perception was (M= 3.52, SD= 1.72). Figures (16, 17) show the histogram and 
box plot of responses respectively. 
 
Figure 16. Histogram of responses for ‘My University only keeps track of major safety 
problems and overlook routine ones….  ’. 
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Figure 17. Box plot of responses to ‘My University only keeps track of major safety 
problems and overlook routine ones ’ 
 
Safety Personnel 
 There are five items in this subscale (N= 123). The response with the highest 
mean was ‘Personnel responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risk 
involved in flight training’. The responses showed that most respondents perceived that 
safety personnel had a clear understanding of the risk involved in flight training. The 
mean value of this perception was (M= 4.21, SD= 1.72).Figure 18 and 19 shows the 
histogram and box plot of the responses. 
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Figure 18. Histogram of responses to ‘Personnel responsible for safety have a clear 
understanding of risk in flight training ’ 
 
 
Figure 19.Boxplot of responses to ‘personnel responsible for safety have a clear 
understanding of risk in flight training’ 
       
 Even though, the mean response was above the midpoint of (3), there are 
indications, that some respondents had a perception that safety personnel had little or no 
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authority compared to operational personnel. The response for this statement yielded the 
least mean (M= 3.75, SD= 1.72).Figures 20 and 21 shows the histogram and box plot of 
the responses respectively. 
 
Figure 20. Histogram of responses to ‘Safety personnel have little or no authority 
compared to operational  personnel.’ 
 
 
Figure 21. Box plot of responses to ‘Safety personnel have little or no authority compared 
to operational personnel.’ 
46 
Informal Safety Scale Indicator 
 Ninety three (93) responses were excluded by the SPSS software, representing 
39.7% of submitted responses and the useable responses (N= 135) was 60.3 %. The mean 
(M= 3.30, SD = 0.36) was also above the neutral point of 3 on the 5 point Likert scale. 
This showed a favorable perception of respondents to the informal safety program of the 
university. The Informal Safety (IS) had three sub-scales namely Accountability/Just 
Culture, Pilot Authority and Professionalism. 
Accountability/Just Culture 
 The sub-scale had five items and the highest mean perception of respondents was 
on the item ‘Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all pilots in the 
university’ (M=3.78, SD=1.82).This shows that respondents generally had a good 
perception on the item. The respondents however had a rather poor perception about the 
item ‘University management shows favoritism to certain pilots’ (M= 2.87, SD= 
1.82).This shows a lingering perception that some level of favoritism occurs. Figures (22, 
23) show the Histogram and Box plot of the item respectively. 
 




Figure 23. Box-Plot of ‘Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all pilots’. 
 
Pilot Authority 
 The sub-scale (N= 123) had five items and the item with the highest mean was 
‘Pilots have little real authority to make decision that affect safety of normal flight 
operations’ (M= 3.50, SD= 1.87) .This shows that generally there was a perception that 
respondents had real authority to make decisions that affect safety of normal flight. 
Figures (24, 25) show the histogram and box-plot of the responses in this sub-scale. 
 
Figure 24. Histogram of ‘pilots have little real authority to make decisions that affect the 




Figure 25. Box-plot of ‘pilots have little real authority to make decisions that affect the 
safety of flight’. 
 
 Respondents were however strong in their perception that ‘Pilots are seldom 
asked for input, when university aviation procedures are developed or changed’ (M= 
2.61, SD= 1.76) by agreeing to the item. This shows how they perceive their role in 
review and change of operations procedures. This was the lowest mean in this sub-scale. 
Figures (26, 27) show the histogram and box-plot of the item. 
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Figure 26. Histogram of ‘Pilots are seldom asked for input, when university aviation 
procedures are developed’. 
 
 
Figure 27.Box-plot of ‘Pilots are seldom asked for input, when university aviation 
procedures are developed’. 
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Professionalism 
 The sub-scale of Professionalism had five items and the item ‘pilots who do not 
fly safely quickly develop a negative reputation among other pilots’ had the highest mean 
(M= 3.71, SD= 1.04).This consolidates the perception that respondents don’t compromise 
unsafe acts and actions detrimental to safety of flight. Figures (28, 29) show the 
histogram and box plot of the responses to the item. This is one item that shows the level 
of peer to peer influence over the safety behavior and personal risk assessment of 
individual pilots. It consolidates the organizational safety culture and how far it has been 
imbibed by personnel. 
 
Figure 28. Histogram of ‘Pilots who don’t fly safely quickly develop a negative 




Figure 29. Box-Plot of ‘Pilots who don’t fly safely quickly develop a negative reputation 
among other pilots’. 
 
 The item ‘Pilots never cut corners or compromise safety regardless of the 
operational pressure to do so’ had the lowest mean (M=2.77, SD= 1.17). There was 
however a strong perception that pilots will cut corners and compromise safety when 
under operational pressure to do so. Figure 30 and 31 shows the histogram and box-plot 
of the items. 
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Figure 30. Histogram of ‘Pilots never cut corners or compromise safety regardless of 




Figure 31. Box-Plot of ‘Pilots never cut corners or compromise safety regardless of  
pressure to do so’ 
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Operations Interaction Scale Indicator 
 The total responses for this section was (N=135) representing 57.7 % of useable 
responses.93 responses representing 42.3% were excluded by the SPSS software due to 
missing data components. The mean value for the perception of respondents was 
(M=3.30, SD =0 .71).This mean was above the neutral point of 3 on the 5 point Likert 
scale used. The result shows a fairly good perception of the operational interaction scale 
indicator of the university’s flight program. The scale had four sub-scales namely, 
Supervisor of flight/Chief CFI/Lead CFI, Dispatch, Instructor/Trainers and Ramp 
Operations. 
Supervisor of flight/Chief CFI/Lead CFI  
 This sub-scale (N=123) had five items and respondents had high perception that 
‘SoF/Chief CFI/Lead CFI has a clear understanding of the risk associated with flight 
operations’. The item had the highest mean (M=4.13, SD= 0.96).Figures 32 and 33 shows 
the responses for this item. 
 
Figure 32.Histogram of ‘Chief/Lead CFI/SoF have a clear understanding of the risk 
associated with flight’ 
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Figure 33. Box-Plot of ‘Chief/Lead CFI/SoF have a clear understanding of the risk 
associated with flight’ 
 
 There was a high perception that pilots reported their safety concerns to their CFI 
and Lead CFI rather than the safety department. This was evident in the evident in the 
low mean for this item (M= 2.17, SD= 1.53). This was one of the items that were reverse 
coded. Figures34 and 35 shows the histogram and box-plot of this item. 
 
Figure 34. Histogram of ‘Pilots often report safety concerns to their Chief/lead CFI/SoF  




Figure 35. Box-plot of ‘Pilots often report safety concerns to their Chief/lead CFI/SoF 
than the safety department’. 
 
Dispatch 
 The sub-scale had four items and gave the perception of respondents to the 
activities of flight dispatch. The highest mean was for the item ‘Dispatch is responsive to 
pilots concern about safety’ (M= 3.90, SD= 1.13).The item shows a positive perception 
of the operations of dispatch. Figures (36, 37) show the histogram and box-plot of the 
item. 
 




Figure 37.Box-Plot of ‘Dispatch is responsive to pilots’ concern about safety of 
operations’. 
 
 The lowest mean for this sub-scale (N= 128) also showed a good perception of 
dispatch procedures. The item ‘Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than 
cancel a flight’ (M= 3.62, SD= 1.81) showed that respondents generally had a perceived 
confidence in the dispatch procedures, since this was one of the reverse coded items. 
Figures (39, 40) show the histogram and box-plot of the item respectively. 
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 The sub-scale (N= 128) had four items and all items were above the neutral point 
(3) on the 5 point Likert scale used. The sub-scale was an overview of the perception of 
respondents on the trainers and instructors in the flight program of the university. There 
was a very good perception that these trainers and instructors consistently emphasized 
safety during training at the university. ‘Safety is consistently emphasized during training 
at my university’ (M = 4.23, SD= 0.87). Figures (40, 41) show the histogram and box-
plot of the item respectively. 
 








 The least value for this sub-scale was ‘Instructors and trainers teach shortcut and 
ways to get around safety requirements’ (M= 3.66, SD= 1.75), which was a good 
perception. Figures (42, 43) show the histogram and box-plot respectively of the item. 
 









 This sub-scale (N= 128) had six items and all the items scored above the neutral 
point (3) on the 5 point Likert scale used. The sub-scale highlighted the role of ramp 
personnel and activities in the flight program. Respondents had a very good perception 
about the activities of ramp personnel. The item ‘Ramp personnel are careful about 
positioning of equipment (e.g. fuel truck, power carts) that poses potential safety hazards 
(M= 4.09, SD= 0.86) had the highest mean and shows the perceived confidence that 
respondents have in ramp operators. Figures (44, 45) show the histogram and box-plot of 
the item respectively. 
 
Figure 44.  Histogram of ‘Ramp personnel are careful about positioning of equipment’ 
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Figure 45. Box-Plot of ‘Ramp personnel are careful about positioning of equipment’ 
 
 The lowest mean for this sub-scale was the item ‘Lack of communication between 
pilots and ramp personnel frequently lead to incidents at the flight line’ (M=3.78, SD= 
1.75) and Figures (47, 48) shows the histogram and box-plots of the item. 
 
Figure 46. Histogram of ‘The lack of communication between ramp personnel and pilots 
contribute to incidents.’ 
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Figure 47. Box-Plot of ‘The lack of communication between ramp personnel and pilots 
contribute to incidents.’ 
 
Organizational Commitment Scale Indicator 
 A total of 133 responses were useable and 101 responses were excluded by the 
SPSS software from this scale. The mean value (M = 3.60, SD= 0.73) was also above the 
neutral point on the 5 point Likert scale used. This scale had five sub-scales namely 
safety values, safety fundamentals and Going beyond compliance. 
Safety Values 
 The sub-scale Safety Values looked at the core values of safety in the university 
flight program. There were five items and the perception of respondents on item ‘Safety 
is a core value in my university’s scored the highest mean (M= 4.46, SD = 0.87).This 
shows a high level of perceived confidence in the university’s safety values by 
63 
respondents. Overall all items in this sub-scale scored above the neutral point of 
3.Figures (48, 49) show the histogram and box plot of the item. 
 
Figure 48. Histogram of ‘Safety is a core value in my university’ 
 
 
Figure 49. Box-Plot of ‘Safety is a core value in my university’ 
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 The lowest mean was on the item ‘Management expects pilots to push for on time 
performance, even if it means compromising safety’ (M= 3.34, SD = 1.76).Since the 
mean response is closer to the neutral point, there are indication that some respondents 
perceive that there are times when management push pilots for on time performance, 
even if it will affect safety. Figures (50, 52) show the histogram and box-plot of the item. 
 
 




Figure 51. Box-Plot of ‘Management expects pilots to push for on time performance’ 
 
Safety Fundamentals 
 The sub-scale (N= 128) had five items and all of them scored above the neutral 
point of 3.The highest mean of the items was the perception about ‘My university ensures 
that maintenance on aircraft are adequately performed and the aircraft is safe to operate’ 
(M = 4.42, SD = 0.84).This shows a very good perception about the maintenance and 
safety of university aircraft for flight operations. Figures (52, 53) outline the histogram 
and box-plot of the item.  
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Figure 53.  Box-Plot of ‘My University ensures that maintenance on aircraft is adequately 
performed’ 
 
 The lowest mean for the sub-scale was on the item ‘Checklist and procedures are 
easy to understand’(M= 3.95, SD = 0.96).The item also show that perception that some 
respondents had problem understanding the checklist and procedures of the university. 
Figures (54, 55) show the histogram and box-plot of the item. 
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Figure 54. Histogram of ‘Checklist and procedures are easy to understand’ 
 
 
Figure 55. Box-Plot of ‘Checklist and procedures are easy to understand’ 
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Going Beyond Compliance  
 The sub-scale Going beyond Compliance (N= 128) had four items and all of them 
scored above the neutral point of 3 on the perception scale. The item with the highest 
mean was ‘Management views regulations violations very seriously, even when they 
don’t result in any serious damage or injury’ (M= 4.02, SD = 1.01). Figures (56, 57) 
shows the Histogram and Box Plot of the item. 
 
Figure 56. Histogram of ‘Management views regulation violations very seriously, even 
when they don’t result in any serious damage.’ 
 
 
Figure 57. Box-Plot of ‘Management views regulation violations very seriously, even 
when they don’t result in any serious damage’ 
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 The item with the lowest mean was the perception of respondents on 
‘Management schedule CFI’s as much as legally possible, with little concern for their 
sleep schedule or fatigue’ (M= 3.23, SD= 1.80). This was interesting as it showed 
perception among some of the respondents that sleep schedule and fatigue to CFI’s was 
compromised and a potential safety issue. Figures (58, 59) show the histogram and box-
plot of the item. 
 





Figure 59. Box-Plot of ‘Management schedule CFI’s as much as legally possible’  
 
University Safety Record 
 Respondents were asked about their general perception and forecast for the safety 
of flight operations at the university and figures 61, 62 and 63 shows their predictive 
perception on the safety of flight operations at the university. The results shows that 
generally there was a perception that within the next 12 months of flight operations at the 
university, there is a chance of an accident occurring and Table 9 and figures 60, 61 and 
62 outlines the results of their perception. The perceptions on the likelihood of an 
accident (M=2.89, SD=1.23) was below the neutral point of 3 and indicates a negative 
perception.  
 The perception of respondents on the likelihood of an incident (M=2.42, 
SD=1.13) shows that there was a negative perception, that a major incident was likely to 
occur in the next twelve months. The perception that the flight program of the university 
would be cited for violations by the FAA (M=3.73, SD=1.20) showed that most 
respondents disagreed and perceived otherwise.  
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Table 9. University Safety Records. 
 
 




Figure 61. Histogram of ‘ likelihood of an incident in flight program’ 
 




 What are the differences in perception among respondents [commercial flight 
students and certified flight instructors (CFIs)] on the status of the safety culture in an 
accredited four year collegiate aviation program?  
 An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to find if there were any significant 
differences in the mean responses of the participants on the safety culture of the flight 
program. A one way independent ANOVA and post –hoc (Games-Howell) analysis was 
used to find out which groups differ in their mean responses, since no specific hypothesis 
was generated before the research (Field, 2009). There was a significant difference in the 
mean responses of perception on the item ‘I feel like I am gambling with the safety of my 
aircraft every time, I go on a training activity’, F(4,128) =2.83, p < .05 ( 2- tailed) which 
falls under the sub-scale of Ramp Operations and major scale of Operations Interaction.  
A post –hoc analysis (Games-Howell) revealed that there were significant differences 
between the mean responses of juniors and freshmen, p< .05 (2- tail).  
 The item ‘My university is committed to equipping aircraft with up to date 
technology’ under the sub-scale of Safety Fundamentals and scale of Organizational 
Commitment showed a significant differences in the mean responses of respondents, 
F(4,126) = 3.02, p<.05. A post –hoc analysis revealed significant differences in the mean 
responses between the juniors and freshmen, p<.05. The other item that showed 
significant differences in mean responses was ‘Management tries to get around safety 
requirements, whenever they get the chance’. The results was F (4,125) = 3.22, 
p<.05.Further post hoc analysis revealed that there was a significant differences in the 
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mean responses of juniors and freshmen, p<.05. Figure 61 shows simple bar graph with 
error bars highlighting the significant mean differences in mean of responses to their 
perception of the safety culture. 
 
Figure 63. Simple bar graph of ‘Mean perception of safety culture’. 
Question Two 
 What are the differences between the perception of international contract students 
and indigenous US students on the status of the safety culture at an accredited four year 
collegiate aviation program?   
 An independent t-test was used to determine if there existed any significant 
differences in the mean perception of the two groups on the safety culture of the 
university’s flight program. The variances in the samples were assumed roughly equal 
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and scores were independent. The mean perception on the status of the safety reporting 
system of the collegiate aviation program of resident US students (M=4.27, SE = 0.23) 
was better than the international contract students (M= 3.77, SE =0.23), when asked ‘The 
safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use’. The responses were all above the 
neutral point of 3.The differences in the mean response was also significant t(132) = -
2.59, p< .05. 
 Pilots do not bother reporting near misses or close calls, since this event does not 
cause any real damage’. The resident US students had a mean response of (M=3.40, 
SE=0.18) as compared to the international students who had (M=2.49, SE= 0.27).The 
difference was significant, t(132) = 2.68,p<.05. This shows that the contract students in 
their perception agreed with the item. The responses for the item ‘Pilots are satisfied with 
the way, the university deals with safety reports’ showed that the contract students (M= 
3.92, SE= 0.23) had a more positive perception than the US students (M= 3.37, SE= 
0.11), even though all of the mean responses were above the neutral point of 3.  
 The differences in their responses was significant, t(132) = 2.35, p< .05.However 
when the mean responses of their perception on the item ‘University only keeps track of 
major safety problems and overlook routine ones’ were compared, the resident US 
students (M=3.92, SE=0.16) disagreed with the item as against the international students 
(M= 2.44,SE= 0.27) who agreed with the item. The differences in their responses was 
significant, t(132) = -4.78, p< .05. 
 Generally there was a good perception on the item ‘Personnel responsible for 
safety hold high status in the university’. The mean responses for the US students 
(M=4.13, SE= 0.07) was higher than the international students (M=3.72, SE= 0.21). The 
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difference in response was significant, t(130) =-2.03, p< .05. Both groups were in strong 
agreement with the item ‘personnel responsible for safety have power to make changes’. 
The mean of responses for the US students (M= 4.34, SE= 0.07) was higher than the 
international students (M= 3.71, SE= 0.21).The difference in responses was significant, 
t(130) = -3.45, p< .05. 
 The two groups also agreed with the item ‘Personnel responsible for safety have a 
clear understanding of the risk involved in flight’. The mean responses of the US students 
(M= 4.31, SE=0.09) was higher than the international students (M= 3.87, SE= 0.21) and 
the differences in the mean responses was significant, t( 130 ) = -2.11, p< .05. The item 
‘safety personnel have little or no authority compared to operational personnel’ showed 
that while the US students (M= 4.29, SE=0.14) disagreed with the item, the international 
students (M= 2.03, SE= 0.27) agreed with it. There was a significant difference in the 
mean of their responses, t(128) = -6.63, p < .05.  
 The item ‘University management shows favoritism to certain pilots’ showed that 
the perception of the US students (M= 3.15, SE= 0.18) were partially neutral, while the 
international students (M= 2.03, SE= 0.27) agreed with the item. The differences in 
response was significant, t(128) = -3.28,p< .05.The international students (M=2, 
35,SE=0.28) had a strong perception that ‘When accidents and incidents happen, 
management always blame the pilot’ as compared to the US students( M= 3.39,SE = 
0.17) who partially disagreed with the item. The differences in their responses was 
significant, t(128) = -3.12,p< .05. 
 The two groups had a neutral perception that ‘Pilots are actively involved in 
identifying and resolving safety concerns’. The responses of the US students (M= 3.23, 
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SE= 0.11) had a lower mean as compared to the international students (M=3.82, SE= 
0.19).The differences in the mean responses for both groups was significant, t(130) = 
2.67,p< .05. The international students (M= 2.26, SE = 0.28) had a strong perception that 
‘Pilots who call in sick or fatigue are scrutinized by the Supervisor of Flight or other 
flight management personnel’, while the US students (M= 3.69, SE=0.18) disagreed with 
the item. The differences in their responses was significant, t(130) = -4.25,p< .05. The 
international students (M=2.53, SE=0.29) also had a strong perception that ‘Pilots have 
little or no authority to make decisions, that affect the safety of normal flight operations’. 
The US students (M=3.45, SE=0.13) however disagreed with the item. The differences in 
their responses was significant t(130) = -3.86, p< .05. 
 The US students ( M=2.88,SE= 0.12) disagreed with the item ‘Pilots who are new 
and less senior are willing to speak up regarding flight safety issues’, while the 
international students ( M= 3.55,SE= 0.21) agreed. There was a significant difference in 
their responses t(130) = 2.80,p< .05.The US students (M=2.47,SE=0.09) however 
disagreed that ‘Pilots, never cut corners or compromise safety, regardless of the 
operational pressures to do so’ while the international students ( M=3.55,SE= 0.21) 
agreed. The was a significant differences in their responses, t(130) = 4.79,p< .05. 
 The international students (M=2.59, SE=0.33) agreed with the item ‘Chief/Lead 
CFI’s and SoF are unavailable when pilots need help’ while the US students (M=4.19, 
SE= 0.16) disagreed. The differences between their response was significant, t(127)= -
4.19,p< .05.The international students(M=2.88,SE=0.32) had a perception that ‘As long 
as there are no accidents or incidents, Chief/Lead CFI’s and SoF don’t care how flight 
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operations are performed’ while the US students(M=4.91,SE=0.16) disagreed. The 
differences in their responses was significant, t(127)= -3.92,p< .05. 
 The international students (M=2.79, SE =0.34) agreed with the item ‘Dispatch 
inappropriately uses MEL, when it is better to fix equipment. The US students (M=4.48, 
SE=0.12) strongly disagreed. The differences in response was significant, t(126) =-5.80,p 
<.05.The US students (M=4.27,SE=0.14) disagreed with the item ‘ Dispatch would rather 
take a chance with safety, than cancel a flight’.  The international students (M= 2.06, SE= 
0.29) strongly agreed. The differences in their responses was significant, t (127) = -
7.35,p< .05. 
 Both US student ( M= 4.28,SE=0.05) and international students ( M=3.91,SE= 
0.18) agreed with the item ‘Instructors/trainers have a clear understanding of the risk 
associated with operations’ .The differences in their responses was significant, t(126)= -
2.49,p< .05.The two  groups US students (M= 4.31,SE=0.13) and international students ( 
M=3.91,SE=0.18) all agreed to the item ‘Safety is consistently emphasized during 
training at my university’. There was a significant difference in their responses, t (126) =-
2.33, p < .05. The international students (M= 2.21, SE= 0.31) had a perception that 
‘Instructors/trainers teach shortcuts and ways to get around safety requirements’ while 
the US students (M= 4.24, SE=0.13) disagreed. The differences in their responses was 
significant, t(126) = -6.89,p < .05. 
 US students (M= 4.17, SE= 0.07) and International students (M=3.76, SE= 0.18) 
agreed to the item ‘Ramp personnel are careful about position of equipment (fuel trucks, 
power carts, etc)’. There was significance in the differences in their response, t(131)= -
2.41,p<.05. The international students (M=2.63,SE=0.31) had a perception that ‘Ramp 
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personnel are careless about removing debris ( e.g. cups,rags,tools,clothing etc) near the 
aircraft, which may pose FOD hazards’. The US students (M=4.28, SE=0.14) did not 
agree with the item. The differences in their responses was significant, t(130)= -
5.49,p<.05. International students (M=2.47, SE=0.31) agreed with the item ‘I feel like I 
am gambling with the safety of my aircraft every time, I go on a training activity’ while 
the US students (M=4.65, SE = 0.10) disagreed. The differences in their response was 
significant, t(131)= -8.54,p< .05. 
 US students (M=3.76, SE=0.16) disagreed with the item ‘Management is more 
concerned with making money than being safe’ while the international students (M=2.58, 
SE=0.31) agreed. The differences in their responses was significant, t(128)= -3.57,p< .05. 
International students (M=2.84, SE = 0.31) agreed to the item ‘Management does not 
show much concern for safety, until there is an accident or incident’ while the US 
students (M=4.14, SE= 0.15) disagreed. Both US Students (M=4.34, SE=0.06) and 
international students (M=3.97, SE=0.18) agreed to the item ‘My university flight manual 
is carefully kept up to date’. The differences in their responses was significant, t(129)= -
2.18,p <.05.  
 US students (M=4.16, SE=0.08) and international students (M=3.79, SE=0.18) 
both agreed to the item ‘My University is willing to invest money, resources, and effort 
to improve safety’. The differences between the responses was significant, t(129)= -
2.18,p< .05. The international students (M=3.87,SE=0.18) and US Students 
(M=4.55,SE=0.05) both agreed to the item ‘My university is committed to equip aircraft 
with up to date technology’. The differences is responses was significant, t(129)= -
4.62,p< .05. The item ‘My University ensures that maintenance on aircraft is adequately 
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performed and aircraft safe to operate’ was agreed to by the US students (M=4.58, 
SE=0.06) and international students (M=3.92, SE=0.19). The differences in their 
response was significant, t(129)= -4.07,p< .05. 
 The US students (M=4.11, SE=0.09) and international students (M=3.55, 
SE=0.20) agreed to the item ‘Management goes above and beyond regulatory minimums, 
when it comes to issues of flight safety’. The differences in their response was 
significant, t(128)= -2.79,p< .05.The international students( M=2.21,SE=0.28) agreed 
that ‘Management schedules CFI’s as much as legally possible, with little concern for 
their sleep schedule or fatigue’. The US students (M=3.67, SE=0.17) however disagreed. 
The differences in the response was significant, t(128)= -4.48,p< .05. 
 The US students (M=4.61, SE=0.11) disagreed that ‘Management tries to get 
around safety requirements, whenever they get the chance’. The international students 
(M=2.32, SE= 0.28) agreed to the item and the differences in the responses was 
significant, t (128) = -9.10,p< .05. Finally both US students (M=4.09, SE=0.10) and 
international students (M=3.68, SE=0.20) agreed that ‘Management views violation very 
seriously, when they don’t result in any serious damage or injury’. The differences of 
their responses was significant, t(128) = -2.00,p < .05. 
Question Three 
 What is relationship between the perception of respondents (flight students and 
certified flight instructors) regarding the informal safety and operation interaction at an 
accredited four year collegiate aviation program?  
 In order to establish any relationship between the major scales, Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient was determined for some items in both scales to find the extent of 
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significant correlations among items. In general there were numerous significant 
correlations of items in Informal Safety and Operations Interaction. The responses to the 
item ‘Dispatch consistently emphasize information or details’ significantly correlated 
with the item ‘pilots are actively involved in identifying and resolving safety concerns’, r 
= .28, p< .01. 
 The responses to the item ‘dispatch inappropriately uses the Minimum Equipment 
List (MEL), when it would be better to fix equipment significantly correlated with the 
item ‘Pilots are seldom asked for input when university aviation procedures are 
developed or changes’, r = .31, p< .01 and significantly (negative) correlated to ‘Pilots 
are actively involved in identifying and resolving safety concerns’, r = -.27, p< .01. The 
item ‘pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by the supervisor of flying or 
other flight management personnel’ significantly correlated responses to the items 
‘Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight’, r = .47, p<.01 and 
‘Dispatch inappropriately uses the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) when it would be 
better to fix the equipment’, r =.48,p<.01.  
 The responses to items ‘Pilots have little or real authority to make decisions that 
affect safety of normal flight operations’ strongly correlated with the item ‘Dispatch 
inappropriately uses MEL, when it is better to fix equipment’ and was significant, r = 
.54,p< .01.  The item ‘management rarely questions a pilot’s decision to delay or request 
for cancellation of a flight for a safety issue’ negatively correlated with the item 
‘Dispatch inappropriately uses MEL when it would be better to fix equipment’ r= -.20,p< 
.01,but positively correlated to the item ‘ Dispatch is responsive to pilots concerns about 
safety of flight operations’ r = .39, p< .01 and they were all significant. Tables 10 and 
83 
10cont, show the correlation tables for items in Informal Safety Scale correlated with 
Operations Interaction Scale. 
Question Four 
 What is the relationship between the perception of respondents (students and 
certified flight instructors) on the formal safety program and their safety behavior at an 
accredited four year collegiate aviation’s program? 
 The question sought to find out if there was any form of relationship between 
perception and safety behavior. Multiple Regressions was used to establish a relationship 
between the perception of respondents on the FS program and their safety behavior. An 
exploratory analysis was developed to use the relationship to establish a predictive model 
for safety behavior, from perception of respondents on the Formal Safety program. 
Perception and attitude have been known to have an influence on behavior (American 
Psychological Association, 2012) and they can be used as leading indicators in SMS to 
predict safety behavior and personal risk. The aim of SMS is to use this safety leading 
indicators to pro actively predict lagging indicators (outcomes) like incidents and 
accidents (ICAO, 2009)   
 A forced method was used and the model summary with the values of R 
(Coefficient of Determination), R² and the adjusted R² were determined. R² gives an idea 
of the proportion of variance, explained by model. The adjusted R² gives an idea how the 
model generalize and ideally when the value is close to R, it indicates that the cross-
validity of the model is good (Field, 2009). The beta-values (B) were also recorded and  
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Table 10. Pearson’s Correlation between Items of Informal Safety and  









shows the how much of the variance in safety behavior can be explained by each of the 
significant predictors (perceptions). 
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 The first item ‘Self-Reported for duty when fatigued, ill, or under unusual stress 
because you had no other choice’ was the outcome variable and Items in FS were used as 
independent variables. The Tables 9 and 10 shows the model summary and coefficients 
of ‘Self-Reported for duty when fatigued, ill or under unusual stress because you had no 
other choice’  




Note p< .01 
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Table 12. Coefficients of ‘Reported for duty when fatigued, ill or under unusual stress’. 
 
 
Note ∗p< .01,∗∗p<.05 
Table 13. Model Summary of ‘been pressured to fly a university aircraft you believe was 
not in safe condition’. 
 
 
Note:∗ p< .05 
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Table 14. Coefficients of ‘Been pressured to fly a university aircraft you believe was not 
in safe condition’. 
 
 
Note:∗ p< .01 
Table 15. Model Summary of ‘Failed to challenge a superior on a safety issue for fear of 




Table 16. Coefficients of ‘Failed to challenge a superior on a safety issue for fear of 
ruining a cordial relationship with the superior’ 
 
 
Note ∗p< .05(model summary), ∗∗p<.01(coefficients) 










   Note∗ p< .05(model),∗∗ p<.01(Coefficients) 






Table 20.Coefficents of ‘Ever been put on flight hold for alcohol or drug violations’ 
 
Note∗ p<.05(Model),∗∗ p<.01(Coefficients) 
Question Five 
 What is the relationship between the perception of respondents (students and 
certified flight instructors) on organizational commitment to safety and perceived 
attitudes that affects safety behavior at an accredited four year collegiate aviation 
program?  
 The question sought to find out if there was any form of relationship between the 
perception of respondents about organizational commitment in the flight program of the 
university and their safety behavior. Multiple Regressions was used to establish a 
relationship between the perception of respondents on the organizational commitment 
and their safety behavior. An exploratory analysis was developed to use the relationship 
to establish a predictive model for safety behavior, from perception of respondents on the 
organizational commitment and their safety behavior. The models that has been proposed 
are for exploratory purposes and can be used as a pro active leading indicator as part of 
trend monitoring in the implementation and management of the SMS. The significant 
results from the research are outlined. 
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Table 21. Model Summary of ‘been  pressured to fly a university aircraft you  believe 
was not  in safe condition’.   
 
 
Table 22. Coefficients of ‘been pressured to fly a university aircraft you believe was not 
in safe condition’  
 
 
Note∗∗ p<.01 (Model),∗p<.05 ( Coefficients) 
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Perception of Safety Culture among Respondents 
The results showed that respondents had a good perception and favorable outlook 
of the safety culture at the university’s flight program. There were however some areas 
that need improvement and the discussion will focus more on the areas for improvement 
of the safety program and how the Safety Management System, can consolidate a more 
proactive and positive safety culture. Generally all the four major CAPCUS factor scales 
had mean values (M) above the midpoint of 3.This means that cumulatively, the 
perception of the respondents on the flight operations of the university was good. The 
Formal Safety Program (M= 3.65), Informal Safety Program (M= 3.34), Operational 
Interaction (M = 3.32) and Organizational Commitment (M = 3.32) was compared to 
previous study by vonThaden (2008) on a flight operations department of a major 
European carrier and the results were similar and consistent.  
The results show that the university formal safety program was perceived as the 
best and the duo of operational interaction and organizational commitment had the least 
score and may indicate that some adverse perception by respondents about these major 
scales. The first research question was to find out the level of variability in the 
perception of flight students and flight instructors on the safety culture in the university’s 
flight program. A good measure of consistency in the safety culture of an organization is 
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to focus on the variance in survey responses (von Thaden , 2008).  When a population 
demonstrates considerable variance, the coherent structure for an underlying culture of 
safety is for all intents and purposes, nonexistent and shows that there are gaps in the 
purpose, alignment and control of the safety management (Patankar, 2003).   
 There was a significant difference in the mean responses of perception on the 
item ‘I feel like I am gambling with the safety of my aircraft every time, I go on a 
training activity’, under the major scale of Operations Interaction. The significant 
differences were between the responses of juniors and freshmen. The results showed that 
while the juniors had a more favorable perception on most items under operations 
interaction, the freshmen had poor perception on these items. Since the university has a 
standard operational procedure and curricula for all flight operations, it was expected 
that there would be very minimal variability of responses among the year groups. 
However variability in perception can be a function of training environment, operational 
interaction, experience level, prior training, fleet assignment, and operational safety 
records (von Thaden, 2008).  
 A significant variation in responses can also be as a result of the risk perception 
among the year groups (Block, 2007). A more risk loving attitude and behavior can 
result in significant safety breaches in the wall of the most formidable safety 
management system (Reason, 2003;Patankar, 2003). Some relevant additional 
comments provided by respondents can be found in the quote below:  
“Once after getting an aircraft refueled by a fuel truck, the fuel truck driver forgot 
to unclip the ground wire from the exhaust pipe of the aircraft.  He drove away 
and the ground wire snapped back towards the truck when he drove far enough 
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away.  There was no apparent damage to the aircraft but the fuel truck driver 
said, "Please don't file a safety report on me." I feel like this was the wrong 
attitude by the fuel truck driver towards safety.  He should be more willing to 
own up to his mistakes’’. 
“I had a fuel personnel knock a static wick off my horizontal stabilizer and not 
tell me (the PIC) about it”. 
“There is not much standard procedure of the travel of line vehicles on the ramp. 
Sometimes they make erratic movements and I don't believe they monitor ground 
frequency, so they are unaware of where aircraft are travelling to. Also the pilots 
are unaware of where line vehicles are travelling”. 
“The training for student line personnel seems weak in the finer details of fuelling 
aircraft. For example some student and fuel truck operators display ignorance in 
the perils of hitting the bottom of a fuel tank, or side loading the filler neck with a 
fuel nozzle. I must applaud ramp personnel for having good situational awareness 
in moving aircraft with tugs. Though they move quickly are very much aware of 
their surroundings”. 
 Concurrence is a critical feature of a healthy safety culture (von Thaden 
,2008; IATA, 2011), as it reflects the degree to which both juniors and freshmen 
share a common perception of the safety culture. It is therefore important for more 
attention to be focused on freshmen by reinforcing safety education especially on 
operations interaction. 
 The item ‘My University is committed to equipping aircraft with up to date 
technology’ under the sub-scale of Safety Fundamentals and scale of Organizational 
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Commitment showed a significant differences in the mean responses of juniors and 
freshmen. There were some relevant comments from respondents in the quote below: 
“As per technology in the aircraft, just look at our fleet. Most of the fixed-wing 
astounding. Most of the helicopters are laughable. I feel that there is not equal 
representation among fixed-wing and rotorcraft in terms of technology. This 
obviously plays a role in safety” 
The quote underscores the perception that updating aircraft with new technology is 
skewed towards fixed wing operation and that management should make a conscious 
effort to create equity in allocation of resources. It can create a perception of management 
not committed to enhancing safety in some fleet of the program.  
 The other item that showed significant differences in mean responses was 
‘Management tries to get around safety requirements, whenever they get the chance’. The 
significant differences in responses were between the juniors and the freshmen. From the 
results, the freshmen seem to have a rather poor perception about the commitment of 
management to safety, while the juniors had a rather good perception. Some notable 
quotes from respondents are highlighted below: 
“The university has a very strong commitment to safety from all departments. 
There are bi-annual safety seminars held for students, staff, and community 
members, the university has a maintenance program that is impeccable, and 
positions such as the Supervisor of Flight and Manager on Duty that help the 
flight operations operate safely and even having a separate safety department 
shows that it is committed to upholding safety” 
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“Especially when dealing with contract students there is a major push to get it 
done regardless of the weather and to push the safety envelope, And when 
someone gets praised for going out and getting time in even though they got ice 
and got stuck in Fargo is extremely unsafe in my eyes.” 
“Management has done absolutely nothing when it has come to the recent icing 
incidents. They are essentially covered up and almost nothing is ever said” 
The diametrical responses and measure of the perception of the commitment of 
management to safety potentially indicates a gap in the safety management of the flight 
program.  
Perception of International students and US students on the Safety Culture in the Program 
 The perceptions of the two groups were analyzed on the basis of the impact of 
national culture on their perception on the safety culture (Hofstede , 2005). Fanjoy (2011) 
in his study on the learning style of chinese collegiate aviation students, observed that 
chinese culture is significantly different from that of the US in terms of power 
distance,individualism and long term orientation. (Joy, 2009) stated that national culture 
has an inpact on individual learning and cognitive style preferences.  Hofstede (2005) 
suggested that when students from a different cultural background are educated in a 
different cultural context, the impact of the cultural differences should be considered to 
identify any potential negative influence.  
‘Pilots do not bother reporting near misses or close calls, since this event does not 
cause any real   damage’.  
 This item on the reporting system of the flight program showed that, the resident 
US students disagreed with the item, while the contract students in their perception 
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agreed with the item. The significant differences in the responses could be as a result of 
the level of risk perception as compared to a similar study on general aviation pilots by 
Hunter(2006). The differences in national culture and language could also affect the 
perception and behavior of these two groups as outlined in the research of 
Helmreich(1999) on crew management resources among multi-cultural crew. 
 However when the mean responses of their perception on the item ‘University 
only keeps track of major safety problems and overlook routine ones’ were compared, the 
resident US students disagreed with the item as against the international students who 
agreed with the item. The differences in their responses were significant. The results 
shows similarities with the study of Dillman( 2009),which showed that flight students 
sometimes simply don’t report safety occurrences because the time,energy and effort 
required to complete documents is not significantly related to the event. There is also the 
issue of  effective feedback from mangement for the effort at reporting safety 
occurrences. Some relevant responses are outlined below: 
“Our safety program does not incorporate a way of tracking safe actions.  Safety 
reports are typically generated when someone exhibits a violation of Safety Policy 
and Procedure or any unsafe action.  There is no real system of maintaining 
actions of safety which I believe they should be able to give recognition to those 
who uphold a safety culture.  We implemented a safety recognition program that 
awards those which certain hour milestones flown without accidents, but does not 
specifically note the events”. 
Some further quotes are outlined below to show a more comprehensive outlook at the 
perceptions of the respondents.  
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“I have used the program and found it to be slow to act and the safety personnel 
have to defer things to the operation side. They do not seem to have the authority 
to change things. There is no feedback when you turn in a safety form. I had a 
problem with something in an aircraft and had to go through two other 
departments and prove to them that it was a problem with the aircraft and not with 
me as they were suggesting”. 
"Pilots can report safety discrepancies without fear of negative repercussions"  
Unfortunately this is not the case, as I have knowledge of cases of CFI's being 
issued performance cards after self-reporting a safety incident to their lead.  
"Pilots do not bother reporting near misses or close calls, since these events don't 
cause any real damage."  The safety reporting system is turning into a punitive 
system, and pilots are becoming afraid to 'throw their peers under the bus' so to 
speak.   
"When a pilot reports a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely manner -  I have 
reported an issue with institutional aircraft placards non-compliance a year ago, 
the problem has not been corrected’’.  
 "Pilots are satisfied with the way the university deals with safety reports - Safety 
reporting has turned into a tattle tale system’’.  
 "Personnel responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risk involved 
in flight training -  It seems like personnel responsible for safety feel like flight 
training should have no risk, which is not possible’’. 
 The US students disagreed with the item ‘safety personnel have little or no 
authority compared to operational personnel’ but the international students strongly 
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agreed with it. There was a significant difference in the mean of their responses. This can 
be an indication of the perceived marginal input of safety personnel in the administration 
and operation of contract flight programs. The international students’ perception is 
probably influenced by their interaction, more with the operational personnel than the 
safety personnel.     
 The item ‘University management shows favoritism to certain pilots’ showed that 
the perception of the US students were almost neutral, while the international students 
agreed with the item. The differences in response was significant and this was correlated 
to the response to the item ‘When accidents and incidents happen, management always 
blame the pilot’ where the international students strongly agreed, while the US students 
partially disagreed. This result is similar to research findings of von Thaden (2008) which 
suggested that a primary challenge regarding accountability concerns perceptions of 
favoritism.  It appears that pilots are not blamed unfairly for their errors, but favored 
pilots may receive more beneficial outcomes than non-favored pilots (Dekker, 2007). 
“I feel that SOF's know the leads well and a lot of them are shown favoritism. 
There has been times when I have seen SOF's breaking SOP's and then when 
asked just giving an excuse. I have witnessed an off-duty SOF try to fly when it 
was clearly no fly and just told the SOF to just sign it and pretend he didn't see the 
conditions change. I believe that the SOF's at the university need to be held to a 
higher standard as they are in an authority role. I also am concerned about how 
management tries to push us to fly when it’s marginal weather in the winter with 
icing around. I understand summer because you can pick up IFR no problem but 
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with icing it scares me. With that said I do feel that upper management really will 
support the pilot decision and is protective of who may be involved’’ 
 The international students had a strong perception that ‘Pilots who call in sick or 
fatigue are scrutinized by the Supervisor of Flight or other flight management personnel’, 
while the US students disagreed with the item The international students also had a strong 
perception that ‘Pilots have little or no authority to make decisions, that affect the safety 
of normal flight operations’. The US students however disagreed with the item. The two 
items rather send a worrying signal about the perception of the international students on 
their input, when it comes to making decisions that can affect the safety of flight. Studies 
by Gordon( 2004) and Dillman (2006) highlights the importance of personnel input in 
order to achieve an effective SMS. 
‘’I put that pilots have very little authority to make safety decisions, because all 
the decisions are already made for us’’  
‘’Pilot reputation is definitely at stake if you don't follow proper procedures. 
There are a lot of peer and staff pressures to do the job as safely as possible. I 
think it would be a great idea for CFIs to reiterate that a new pilot can question 
them at anytime without penalty about operational conduct” 
“Lead flight instructors push too hard to increase productivity.  They challenge a 
line instructor’s ability to say no because of weather.  The same ones allow SOF's 
to do things they will not allow line instructors to do.  I fear a serious incident will 
occur before the top level realizes the pressure and questions lead instructors are 
placing on fatigues line instructors. It needs to stop’’ 
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‘’Pilots are almost always scrutinized when cancelling flights.  Superiors tend to 
ignore suggestions of new pilots and encourage students to cut corners and go 
outside their safety window to make them fly’’ 
 The US students disagreed with the item ‘Pilots who are new and less senior are 
willing to speak up regarding flight safety issues’, while the international students agreed. 
This was quite a unusual since Hofstede (1980), Helmreich (1999) and Hofstede ( 2005) 
suggested that national cultures with Low Power Distance like the US,has a tendency to 
be more assertive and bold,when in a group as compared to the international 
students,who mostly have a culture that is more of a High Power Distance,which makes 
them less willing to challenge authority. The US students however disagreed that ‘Pilots, 
never cut corners or compromise safety, regardless of the operational pressures to do so’ 
while the international students agreed. National cultural values like Uncertainty 
Avoidance (rules and order) (Hofstede, 1980) (Hofstede , 2005) could largely influence 
this perception. Respondents provided comments to reinforce their perceptions and are 
quoted below:  
“I think in general most pilots treat safety with respect and are professional about 
safety, but there are some who are much more willing to cut corners or ignore 
safety policies and procedures than others’’. 
“Students are negatively impacted by not meeting flight templates which 
promotes them to cut corners and fly when they should not’’ 
“Many of the safety violation I have read about that could have easily been 
prevented seem to stem from the feeling pressure to finish on time.  The 
university could not do a worse job in planning courses so the weather or other 
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variables are accounted for.  This makes it very difficult for a pilot under heavy 
financial and other external pressures to make a good unbiased decision. Getting 
done at the cost of a few minor safety infractions can seems more then fair when 
facing astronomical flight costs.  Especially when the policies seem to be written 
by higher ups who are far removed from the flight line”. 
 The international students agreed with the item ‘Dispatch inappropriately uses 
MEL, when it is better to fix equipment. The US students) strongly disagreed. The US 
students disagreed with the item ‘Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety, than 
cancel a flight’. The international students strongly agreed. This was another worrying 
trend in flight operations interaction of the university. It could be as a result of the 
operational tempo of the contract training, which sometimes require that, international 
student fly under some  pressure to meet company deadlines. 
 US students disagreed with the item ‘Management is more concerned with 
making money than being safe’ while the international students agreed. The International 
students agreed to the item ‘Management does not show much concern for safety, until 
there is an accident or incident’ while the US student’s .The international students agreed 
that ‘Management schedules CFI’s as much as legally possible, with little concern for 
their sleep schedule or fatigue’ the US students however disagreed. The US students 
disagreed that ‘Management tries to get around safety requirements, whenever they get 
the chance’. The international students agreed to the item. The perception of the 
international students was consistent in their mean responses and reflected a rather poor 
outlook and raises a gap in alignment of safety education coverage in their contact 
training. 
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“The organization as a whole is more concerned with making money then the 
safety or concern of the students.  Everyone from CFI's to lead flight instructors 
are more concerned about draining the student's money then helping the student 
succeed” 
 “With the amount of contract training we are doing and the pressure we are under 
to get them done on time I would say that is a recipe for an accident/incident”. 
“Student's are always pressured to fly even if they themselves don't feel like they 
could safely due to illness or other reasons”. 
Perception on Relationship between the Informal Safety and Operational Interaction 
 Pearson’s correlation was determined for some items in both scales to find the 
extent of significant correlations among items. The results show significant correlations 
of items in Informal Safety and Operations Interaction. This was compared to similar 
study by vonThaden (2008) and showed that, a high correlation of items in the two major 
scales could indicate, more lateral safety management approach that is peer-driven. A 
look at the results showed that there was a level of consistency in the perception of 
respondents on the items under both major scales. The consistency also helped to cross-
validate the responses and give a better understanding of the safety culture in the 
university. 
 The responses to items ‘Pilots have little or real authority to make decisions that 
affect safety of normal flight operations’ strongly correlated with the item ‘Dispatch 
inappropriately uses MEL, when it is better to fix equipment’ and was significant. The 
results show that as perception of respondents on an item could influence their perception 
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on another item in another scale of the survey and show that perception is susceptible to 
changes in event and information flow.  
 The item ‘management rarely questions a pilot’s decision to delay or request for 
cancellation of a flight for a safety issue’ negatively correlated with the item ‘Dispatch 
inappropriately uses MEL when it would be better to fix equipment’ but positively 
correlated to the item ‘ Dispatch is responsive to pilots concerns about safety of flight 
operations’ and they were all significant. The better the perception of respondents on the 
positive role of dispatch seems to have a positive effect on the perception of respondent 
on the authority of pilots to make informed and safe decisions on flight issues. 
Perception on Relationship between Formal Safety and Safety Behavior  
(Personal Risk) 
 The effect and relationship of the scale on the risk perception and behavior of 
respondents was determined using Multiple Regression. The question also attempted to 
develop a model that can be used as a predictor of safety behavior from perceived 
attitudes of respondents. The success of any proactive SMS depends on the ability to 
identify leading indicators of safety to be able to determine the outcome of any safety 
action of intervention (IATA, 2011). The predictive safety model could help in 
proactively outlining significant predictors and their contribution in causing the safety 
occurrence (outcome).  
 The item “Reported for duty, when fatigued, ill and under unusual stress because 
you had no choice” was significant and had positive predictor ‘Pilots do not bother 
reporting near misses or close calls, since this events do not cause real damage’, but a 
negative predictor ‘pilots are willing to report information regarding marginal 
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performance or unsafe actions of pilots’. This shows that a pro active peer to peer safety 
advocacy and non-punitive reporting system can reduce potential at risk flight related 
behavior. 
 The item ‘been required to fly a university aircraft, you did not believe was in a 
safe condition’’ had a positive predictor ‘Safety personnel have little or no authority as 
compared to operational personnel’. The more respondents had a perception that safety 
personnel lacked the authority to ensure safety oversight, the greater their perceived risk 
of flying a university aircraft believed to be unsafe. This can indicate that there is an 
expectation on safety personnel, to have more leverage in mitigating flight operational 
risk. The item ‘Failed to challenge a superior on a safety issue for fear of ruining a cordial 
relationship’ had a positive predictor ‘pilots do not bother reporting near misses or close 
calls, since this events don’t cause any real damage’. The relationship between flight 
crew is very important. The result is similar with the study done by Kanki ( 2010),which 
showed that due to  the effect of Trans-Cockpit Authority Gradient (TAG) ,subordinate 
flight crew members assertiveness can be diminished and they may not voice out safety 
concerns to their superiors on the flight deck.Helmreich (1999) also explained that  Low 
Uncertainity Avoidance effect, can affect some students not to be bold to voice out safety 
concerns when flying with instructors or flight management personnel.   
 The item ‘allowed an instructor pilot’s or senior pilot’s error to go unchallenged’ 
had a predictor ‘ My university only keeps track of major safety problems and overlook 
routine ones’.This results show a preception that the university is more concerned with 
major safety problems and as such reporting errors or challenging senior pilots and 
instructor pilots ,who are normally perecieved to be more proficient and less prone to 
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error,will not be important.This could indicate a serious misalignment of the perception 
of respondents and flight management and has the potential to create safety occurrences. 
 Perception on Relationship between Organizational Commitment and Safety Behaviour 
(Personal Risk) 
 The role of management to ensure that purposeful organization of human,material 
and financial resources are avialable and judiciously distributed at all levels down the 
organization is very crucial in setting and attaining goals  (Dresner, 2002;CASA, 2009). 
The item ‘ Been pressured to fly a university aircraft that you did not believe was in a 
safe condition’ had three significant predictors.It had two positive predictors 
‘managament does not show concerns for safety,until there is an accident’ and ‘Upper 
Level management tries to get around safety,whenever they get the chance’. 
 The negative predictor ‘My university is willing to invest money and resources to 
improve safety’ shows that respondents do not feel pressured and are less concerned 
about the safety of the aircraft, when they percieve that the university is willing to invest 
money and resources to improve safety.  This finding is similar to research by Damon( 
2011) which showed that when management pro actively invest in safety,there are 
substantial returns on investment.Some of these returns are crew confidence,minimal 
incidents,employee productivity and enhanced business outlook.  
Limitations 
 There were some limitations present within the study. Since the survey is 
anonymous there was no way for the researcher to follow up in case of questions 
requiring further feedback and responses. In addition, due to this anonymity there was no 
way to ensure that individuals only took the survey once. The sample was also limited to 
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commercial aviation students, international contract students and flight instructors who 
are active in the flight program of the university. Perceptions are dynamic and can be 
influenced by information, mood, attitude, sensory experience, cognitive structure and 
changes in event (American Psychological Association, 2012).In all the data analysis, the 
exclusion of certain data, based on non- responses by participants ,was done solely by the 
SPSS software, which coded  any non-response as zero .   
 It was assumed that during the period of the data collection, the safety culture at 
the university was unchanged. The study also assumed that leading metrics of safety such 
as perception and attitudes could have an effect on behavior and can be used as a 
predictor of respondent behavior. The results of the study was also limited to the study 
population, since safety culture is dynamic and could vary due to different procedures, 
type of operations, environment and population. It was assumed that all international 
contract students had a proficient reading and written comprehension level of the English 
language, since the survey was in English. Finally the study could not actually 
authenticate the truthfulness of self reported responses on personal risk or safety 
behavior, since respondents were anonymous. The study assumed self reported responses 
from participants were factual.  
Future Studies 
Safety Culture assessment is a dynamic process and requires establishing a 
baseline for comparison. There has to be a continuous assessment over a given time 
period to be able to build a confident data base for comprehensive analysis. Due to 
changes in procedures, operations and even the human components, the safety culture of 
an organization will always evolve and safety staff and management would have to 
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continuously review the effectiveness of the safety management system (ICAO, 2009). 
Safety assurance is a cyclic process even when the SMS is fully matured, since 
there will always be the need for periodic review and continuous improvement (Stolzer, 
2011). Safety culture studies should be continued on other populations in the university’s 
flight program like ATC, Maintenance and UAS personnel. There should also be an 
assessment of the perceptions of university aviation management on the safety culture 
and the results correlated with the perception of students to be able to gauge the vertical 
extent of SMS saturation. 
Another area that requires study is building good fit model of leading indicators 
like perception, attitude and behavior and using it as a predictor of lagging indicators 
(safety outcome) like incidents, accidents and violations (IATA, 2012). It is also 
recommended that further studies be conducted in other collegiate aviation programs and 
the results cross validated to build a useable database for predictive safety studies. It is 
recommended that the FAA, university aviation programs in the US and industry players 
provide funds for an intercollegiate safety culture assessment research program, to 
provide baseline for the implementation and continuous improvement of SMS in 
universities.  
The proposed research on safety culture assessment and SMS, will establish the 
necessary structures before the FAA adopts a final rule on SMS for Part 141 training 
organizations in the near future. It is also more important to invest in SMS, because of 
global awareness on the return on investment on safety and as more international flight 
training contracts are undertaken by US universities (Lercel, 2011).   Finally, more 
studies should also be conducted on the effect of national culture on the perceptions and 
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behavior of foreign students in flight training programs of US universities, which are 
implementing SMS.     
Conclusion 
As part of the implementation of a Safety Management System in a four year Part 
141 collegiate aviation program, a safety culture assessment was conducted to find out 
the perception of flight students and flight instructors on the safety culture in the flight 
program. A safety culture perception survey of a sample of flight students and instructors 
was conducted using a modified survey called CAPSCUS. The flight program had 
perception mean values (M) of, Formal Safety Program (M= 3.65), Informal Safety 
Program (M= 3.34), Operational Interaction (M = 3.32) and Organizational Commitment 
(M = 3.32). The values were above the neutral point of 3 on a 5 point Likert Scale. This 
means that cumulatively, the perception of the respondents on the safety culture in the 
flight program of the university was good. 
There was a good perception of respondents on the professional role of dispatch, 
which seem to have an effect on their authority to make informed and safe decisions on 
flight issues. There was a perception of respondents that the safety reporting system in 
the program was convenient to use and personnel responsible for safety had a clear 
understanding of the risk involved in flight training. The respondents also had a 
perception that the university ensures that maintenance on aircraft, were adequately 
performed and generally aircraft were safe to fly.  
The respondents also had a very good perception that safety was a core value in 
the university. The respondents also had a good perception that management viewed 
regulations violations seriously, even when they don’t result in any serious injury to 
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personnel or damage to aircraft.  There was also another good perception, that safety is 
consistently emphasized during training at the university, however some respondents 
perceived that ,there was over emphasis, which was leading to a state of ‘safety fatigue’.  
There were however some negative perception of respondents.  Respondents had 
a perception that, the university flight management showed favoritism to certain pilots. 
There was also a perception that equipping and up-dating aircraft was skewed to favor 
fixed wing aircraft, to the disadvantage of helicopters. There was a perception that 
respondents were seldom asked for input when, when university aviation procedures 
were developed or changed. There was also a perception that respondents would cut 
corners or compromise safety, when under operational pressure to do so. There was a 
perception among respondents that sleep schedule and fatigue among CFI’s were 
compromised and was a potential safety issue. 
The study revealed that there were significant variance in the perception of 
respondents on the safety culture by year groups and that could potentially arise due to 
different flight operational experience level and years spent in the flight program. There 
was an observed trend that the more years and time spent in the aviation program, the 
better the perception of the safety culture. This was reflected in the responses between 
the year groups. Significantly the responses between the juniors and freshmen showed 
that while the juniors had a very favorable perception of the safety culture, the freshmen 
had less favorable perception of the safety culture. There should be a proactive review of 
the safety education program to better suit the characteristics of these aviation student 
population, as part of the SMS implementation. There should be more attention and 
emphasis of the safety program for freshmen and new personnel in the flight program.  
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There were also significant differences in the perceptions of US students and 
international contract students on the program’s safety culture. The differences could be 
as a result of prior or dissimilar operational experience, language and cultural 
environment. Generally the US students had a more favorable perception of the safety 
culture than the international contract students. The international students had a 
perception that pilots who called in sick or fatigued, were scrutinized by flight 
management personnel. The international students also perceived that pilots had little or 
no authority to make decisions that affect flight safety. The international students also 
had a perception that pilots who are new or less senior were unwilling to speak up 
regarding flight safety issues. 
The international students also had a perception that management did not show 
much concern for safety, until there was an accident or incident and that management 
tries to get around safety requirements, whenever they get the chance. The international 
students also had a perception that flight management personnel were unavailable when 
pilots need help. Finally the international students had a perception that they were 
gambling with the safety of the aircraft any time they went on a training activity. 
The study shows that there was a need to modify and restructure the safety 
education program for international contract students, which will take their specific 
national culture and differences into consideration.  There should be a proactive effort, to 
bridge the national culture and safety expectations of the international contract students 
with the university safety culture, so that there will be less safety misalignment. The 
safety alignment could be achieved through detailed and modified safety education 
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curriculum, during the initial phase of training at the university and through periodic 
recurrent safety education. 
The respondents also had a perception that due to the intensity and operational 
tempo of flight training at the university, especially contract training, there was a high 
likelihood of an incident and accident in the next twelve months of the flight year. The 
respondents however had a perception that the university would not be cited by the FAA, 
within the twelve month flight period.  There was also significant correlation in some of 
the items of Informal Safety scale and Operations Interaction. Relationships in the form 
of regression models were derived to predict Safety Behavior and personal risk from the 
perceptions of respondents on the Operation Interaction and Formal Safety. Some 
predictors were statistically significant. This was a quote from a respondent on the 
general perception of the safety culture. 
“The program in place is great! I feel that with some culture changes to the mind 
set, this program will show much improvement”.  
An innovative, peer involved and dynamic approach should be adapted in the 
promotion of safety and risk management. This approach would help to reduce 
indifference and apathy towards the safety program. An exploratory model was 
recommended to predict risky behavior and safety outcomes using self reported 
perceived attitudes of front line personnel like flight students and flight instructors. This 
would augment predictive safety risk management processes already in place like Flight 































Commercial Aviation Program Safety Culture Survey (CAPSCUS) 
 
Q3 Reporting System Please rate the university aviation official system for reporting safety 




















and easy to 
use. (1) 




















            
Pilots do not 
bother 
reporting near 







            
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 cause any real 
damage. (4) 
Pilots are 




if the situation 
was caused by 
their own 
actions. (5) 
            
Q4 Response and Feed back.This item refers to the response pilots receive from your university 



















regularly to all 
other pilots in 
this university. 
(1) 
            




corrected in a 
timely 
manner. (2) 
            
Pilots are 
satisfied with 




            
My university 
only keeps 














            
Q5 Safety Personnel.This item refers to the person or people in your university who are formally 

















for safety hold 
high status in 
the university. 
(1) 












have a clear 
understanding 




            
Safety 
personnel 





            
Safety 





to safety. (5) 
Q6 Please use the space below for any extra comment on Formal Safety Program. 
Q7 Accountability/Just Culture These items refer to the ways in which pilots are treated on their 


















to certain pilots. 
(1) 





applied to all 
pilots in this 
university. (2) 
            
When pilots 
make a 
mistake or do 
something 
wrong, they 
are dealt with 
fairly by the 
university. (3) 









            
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Q8 Pilots' Authority This items refer to the extent to which pilots have the authority to provide 


































            
Pilots who 
































of a flight for 
a safety 
issue. (5) 
Q9 Professionalism This issue refers to the attitudes you perceive among your fellow pilots in 



















as their own 
and take 
pride in it. (1) 









            
Pilots who 
are new and 
less senior 

























do so. (5) 
            
Q10 Please use space below for any extra comments on Informal Safety Program 
Q11 Chief/Lead Certified Flight Instructors ( CFI's) and Supervisor of Flight (SoF)These items refer 


















Chief/Lead CFI's and 
SoF do not hesitate 
to contact pilots to 
proactively discuss 
safety. (1) 
            
Chief/Lead CFI's and 
SoF are unavailable 
when pilots need 
help. (2) 
            
As long as there are 
no accidents or 
incidents,Chief/Lead 
CFI's and SoF don't 
care how flight 
operations are 
performed. (3) 
            
Chief/Lead CFI's 
have a clear 
understanding of 
the risk associated 
with flight 
operations. (4) 
            
Pilots often report 
safety concerns to 
their Chief/Lead 
CFI's and SoF rather 
            
124 
than the safety 
department. (5) 























Ms) that affect  
Flight safety. (1) 





(MEL) when it would 
be better to fix 
equipment. (2) 
            
Dispatch is 
responsive to pilots' 
concerns about 
safety of operations. 
(3) 
            
Dispatch would 
rather take a chance 
with safety than 
cancel a flight. (4) 
            
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training at my 
university. (2) 
            
Instructors/trainers 
teach shortcuts 
and ways to get 
around safety 
requirements. (3) 
            
Instructors/trainers 
prepare pilots for 
the various safety 
situations, even 
uncommon or 
unlikely ones. (4) 
            
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Q14 Ramp Operations (Fuel truck drivers and maintenance personnel) these items refer to ramp 


























            






to an incident 
at the flight 
line. (2) 
            









aircraft, even if 
damage is not 
readily 
apparent. (3) 







            
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tools, clothing 
etc) near the 
aircraft, which 








the flight line. 
(5) 
            
I feel like I am 
gambling with 
the safety of 
my aircraft 
every time I go 
on a training 
activity. (6) 
            
 
Q15 Please use the space below for any extra comments on Operational Interaction. 
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Q16 Safety Values This items refer to the value that your university's upper level management 















Safety is a 
core value in 
my university 
(1) 








            
Management 
expects pilots 
to push for on 
time 
performance, 









until there is 
an accident or 
incident. (4) 
            
Management 









Q17 Safety Fundamentals These items refer to your university's typical practices related to 


















are easy to 
understand 
(1) 







kept up to 
date. (2) 







and effort to 
improve 
safety. (3) 






















            
Q18 Going Beyond Compliance These items refer to university upper level management's 





































            
Management 





they get the 















            
Q19 Please use the space below for any extra comments on Organizational Commitment. 
Q20 Personal Risk (PR) and Organizational Risk (OR) The following items describe behaviors that 
aviation professionals sometimes engage in or feel pressured to engage in. Please answer each 
item twice. In the first case refer to your own behavior and the next to the behavior of other 
pilots that you know. Please remember that your answers to this questionnaire are 
COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS and no attempt will be made to personally identify you. Your honest 
answer will help me to make effective recommendations regarding aviation safety at your 
university. 
 Self Others 



























                
been 
pressured to 
take -off or 















believe was in 
safe 
condition. (3) 









                
Made a hard 
landing that 
you did not 
report. (5) 
















                
Q21 Please use the space below for any extra comments on Safety Behavior. 












































is likely to 
be cited by 







            
Q23 Please use the space below for any extra comments on your University's Safety Record. 
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Q24 Please note: this information is for research purposes only and would not be used to 
identify you personally.  Academic Year Group 
 Freshman (1) 
 Sophomore (2) 
 Junior (3) 
 Senior (4) 
 Other ( Please specify in the space below) (5) ____________________ 
Q25 Gender 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
Q26 Are you an International Contract Student. 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q27 Age 
 Below 20 (1) 
 20-30 (2) 
 31-40 (3) 
 41-50 (4) 
 51-60 (5) 
 60+ (6) 
Q28 Certificates/Ratings (Please check all that apply) 
 Student (1) 
 Private (2) 
 Commercial - Single Engine (3) 
 Commercial-Multi Engine (4) 
 CFI (5) 
 CFII (6) 
 MEI (7) 
 ATP (8) 
 Other certificates and type ratings (9) ____________________ 
Q29 Have you ever reported a safety problem at your university? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Q30 Please use the space below for any additional comments you have. Thank you very much 





Informed Consent Form 
Introduction 
 
This study attempts to collect information about the perception of front line operational personnel like commercial flight students 
and certified flight instructors (CFI's) referred to as PILOTS in this study, on the status of the safety culture in the collegiate 
aviation program. The study will also find out if there are differences in these perceptions and try to establish a relationship 
between these perceptions on the safety culture and safety behavior.  
Procedures 
You are invited to participate in this study and it is important, you understand the procedures and your rights. You are asked to 
answer a short questionnaire about your perception about the aviation safety culture in the university. The questionnaire consists 
of thirty (30) questions with 5 likert -scale and a Not Applicable options. The questionnaire includes open ended essay style 
questions with spaces for extra comments and will take approximately 30 minutes or less. Questions are designed to determine 
how you perceive the safety culture in the collegiate aviation program, after the implementation of a Safety Management System 
(SMS) phase 1 and 2.The questions also assess the strength of relationship between your perceived safety culture and safety 
behavior. This questionnaire will be conducted with an on-line created survey called the Collegiate Aviation Program Safety 
Culture Survey (CAPSCUS). 
Risks/Discomforts 
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel emotionally uneasy when asked to make judgments based 
on your perception of some safety issues affecting aviation safety at the university. You are allowed to omit questions that you feel 
uncomfortable answering. Although we do not expect any harm to come upon any participants due to electronic malfunction of the 
computer, it is possible though extremely rare and uncommon. 
Benefits 
There are no direct financial benefits for participants. However, it is hoped that through your participation, the researcher will come 
up with recommendations on how to enhance a positive organizational safety culture and continuously improve aviation safety at 
the university. 
Confidentiality 
Identifying information will not be collected in this study. Data will only be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting only 
combined results and never reporting individual ones). All questionnaires will be secured by electronic password, and no one 
other than the primary investigator and individuals with legal authority will have access to them. The data collected will be stored 
in the UND-secure database until it is deleted by the primary investigator in accordance with UND policy on data disposal. 
Compensation 
There is no direct compensation; however, participants are strongly encouraged to partake in this survey to help in the continuous 
improvement of aviation safety at the university. 
Participation  
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime or refuse to participate 
entirely without jeopardy to your relationship with the aviation department or the university. If you desire to withdraw, please close 
your Internet browser and notify the principal investigator at this email: daniel.adjekum@my.und.edu  
Questions about the Research 
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Daniel Kwasi Adjekum , at 701-630-9743, kadjekum@yahoo.com or 
daniel.adjekum@my.und.edu. 
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Questions about your Rights as Research Participants If you have questions you do not feel comfortable asking the 
researcher, you may contact (Bill Watson,J.D.), 701-740-3277, 211 Odegard Hall, watson@aero.und.edu. Or contact the director 




INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN AN AVIATION SAFETY CULTURE PERCEPTION 
SURVEY 
 
My name is Daniel Kwasi Adjekum and I am a graduate student at the UND Odegard 
School of Aerospace Sciences. I am presently completing a Master of Science (MS) 
program in Aviation and in my third semester. 
I am currently working on my thesis, which is in the area of assessing the perceptions of 
commercial flight students and certificated flight instructors (CFI) on the safety culture of 
the UND flight program. The survey is an on line questionnaire, which is strictly 
voluntary and confidential and no identifying information will be collected. All 
information and data would be secured in line with UND IRB policy on handling of data. 
You are invited to kindly visit the link, which is pasted here. Your Anonymous Survey Link: 
https://und.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6MzrGsI9Ma6egLP 
  It will also be securely sent to your UND mail inbox and by using a password, which is 
your UND mail password, answer the questions. Your candid opinion will help me to 
establish relationships and differences in the perceived status of aviation safety at UND 
Aerospace and how it affects safety behavior. 
This study is in line with establishing a baseline study for our safety culture and to 
continuously improve safety as part of our Safety Management System (SMS) 
implementation plan. 
For any further clarification and information please feel free to send me an email at 
kadjekum@ yahoo.com or Daniel.adjekum@my.und.edu. 
Thanks for your participation.  
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Appendix D 
RE: Gentle Reminder about request for assistance 
1 recipient 
CC: recipients You More 
BCC: recipients You  
Show Details  
FROM: 
• Von Thaden, Terry L  
TO: 
• kwasi adjekum  
Message starred  
Tuesday, October 16, 2012 3:11 AM 
Capt Adjekum, 
 
The CASS items are available in the open literature. You certainly may use them; just need to 





Terry L. von Thaden, Ph.D. 
Illinois Fire Service Institute  






11 Gerty Drive 
Champaign, IL 61820 USA 
 
http://www.fsi.illinois.edu/ 
"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice, there is." 
-- Jan L. A. van de Snepscheut  
 
From: kwasi adjekum [kadjekum@yahoo.com] 
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2012 11:00 AM 
To: Von Thaden, Terry L 
Subject: Gentle Reminder about request for assistance 
Hi Terry 
I hope you had a good week end. I am writing to remind you about my request to use and 
modify if possible, the questions in the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) for my 
intended safety culture survey at an accredited collegiate aviation flight department. This is part 
139 
of my research thesis for a Master of Science degree in aviation. I intend to use an array of 
questions from the CASS and other sources to assess the safety climate/culture and also draw 
inference on strength of relationship about perceptions and safety behavior. I would be most 
grateful if you could get me a feedback on the possibility of using the CASS and what the 
modalities will be in using it. 
Thanks and as always have a great day. 
Daniel Kwasi Adjekum 
Graduate Service Assistant 
UND Aerospace 
701-630-9743  
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